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ABSTRACT
From Condemnation to Conformity: Carter and Reagan’s Foreign Policy towards the Argentine
Junta, 1977-1982
by
William Houston Gilbert

This study examines how the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan responded to
the widespread human rights abuses committed by the Argentine military during the country’s
Dirty War between 1977 and 1982. The objective is to gain a broader understanding of the
policies pursued by both administrations. Under Carter, who brought human rights to the
forefront of American foreign policy, Argentina was heavily targeted and sanctioned with the
anticipation that such measures would enhance the human rights status in Argentina. Ultimately,
such policies resulted in open hostility in bilateral relations, culminating in Argentina’s refusal to
support Carter’s proposed grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980. Reagan moved to restore
relations until Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands in April, 1982. The works of many authors
were consulted in conjunction with newspapers, journal articles, government proceedings, and
declassified documents obtained from the National Security Archives.

2

Copyright 2005 by William Houston Gilbert
All Rights Reserved

3

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated in memory of all those who disappeared during the Dirty War and for my
best friend and inspiration in life, Joanie Thomas.

4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work presented innumerable challenges, requiring a number of long nights and a lot
of hard work from myself and many other individuals. Without them, none of this would have
been possible. First and foremost, I would like to thank the director of my thesis, Dr. Melvin
Page, for his patience and diligence throughout this entire process. Certainly none of this would
have been possible without his help and advice. I would also like to extend my appreciation to
the other members of my committee, Dr. Henry Antkiewicz and Dr. Kenneth Mijeski. Likewise,
thanks to Carlos Osorio and all the fine staff at the National Security Archives for their work in
the Argentina Declassification Project and assisting me with declassified material. Finally, I
would like to express my gratitude to my family, friends, and others who have tolerated me
during the past few months.

5

CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT……….………………………………………………………………………………2
DEDICATION…….………………………………………………………………………………4
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………...5
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….7
2. ANATOMY OF A DIRTY WAR……...………………………………………………12
3. ARGENITNA AS A PARIAH…………………………………………………………28
Argentina as a Target…………………………………………………………….30
The Pressure Pays Off………………………………………………………42
4. THE 1980 GRAIN EMBARGO NEGOTIATIONS…………………………………...46
Opposites Attract: Soviet–Argentine Relations………………………………….55
Carter Rethinks……………………………………………………………..60
5. REVISION, REALISM, AND REAGAN……………………………………………..70
The Argentine–American Alliance………………………………………………77
The Malvinas…...………………………………….…………………….....85
6. CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………………….88
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………..93
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………………103

6

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s, Argentina was plagued by widespread terrorism from both the far right
and the extreme left. Yet, with the coming to power in 1976 of the first of three successive
military juntas, the ruling armed forces responded to the violence by unleashing their own form
of state-sponsored terrorism that overwhelmed the forces they were combating. While exact
statistics on victims are not known, roughly 15,000 to 20,000 Argentine citizens were illegally
abducted from the streets, from their place of work, or from their homes, taken to one of the
more than 300 clandestine prisons established throughout the country and subjected to
horrendous torture. Many of these individuals were eventually murdered. Known by many as
Argentina’s Dirty War, the period of military rule from 1976 to 1982 represented the most brutal
era in the country’s history.
As with most major events in Latin America during the Cold War, the United States
government has been widely condemned for its role during the Dirty War period. Much of this
criticism has centered on the School of the Americas, or the SOA. Founded in 1946 and located
in the Panama Canal Zone until it was relocated to Fort Benning Georgia in 1984, the SOA
specialized in counterinsurgency, training over 57,000 Latin American military personnel
including Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, Salvadorian death-squad leader Roberto
D’Aubuisson, and Panamanian drug lord Manuel Noriega. While there, these officers were
trained in irregular warfare, counterinsurgency, and the methods and theory of torture.1

1

A number of works on the SOA are widely available. Among the best and most objective are Jack
Nelson-Pallmeyer, School of Assassins: Guns, Greed, and Globalization (New York: Obis Books, 2003) and Lesley
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By 1976, over 600 Argentine officers had graduated from the school and nearly 4,000
military personnel had received formal training from the U.S. military. Roberto Viola and
Leopoldo Galtieri, two of the three junta presidents during the dirty war, along with Urruty
Formiguni, head of a notorious torture center, are only a few of the notorious graduates of the
SOA. In September 1996, the Pentagon at last admitted that its students were taught torture,
murder, sabotage, bribery, blackmail, and extortion for the achievement of political aims; that
hypnosis and truth serum were recommended for use in the interrogations; and that the parents of
captives be arrested as an inducement for prisoners to talk. All of these methods were widely
incorporated and used during the dirty war period.2
Yet, such critiques of the SOA, although constructive, serve to obscure two important
elements. First, the national security doctrine applied by the Argentine military during the era of
the dirty war was not simply an example of a “Yankee export.” Rather, it was molded by the
Argentine military’s own philosophy of counterinsurgency and training from a number of foreign
countries. These included the large number of former Nazis who fled Germany following the
fall of the Third Reich, who trained Argentine personnel in the 1950s and 60s, and the French,
whose anti-subversive techniques in Algeria and Indochina were widely studied and adopted by
the armed forces in Argentina. The latter proved to be far more influential. In fact, a permanent
unit of French military advisors was present in Argentina throughout the dirty war period. This

Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training, and Political Violence in the Americas (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004).
2

Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry told reporters during a meeting of Western Hemisphere
defense ministers that the U.S. would never again train Latin American military personnel in the application of
torture. His comments were carried in the Boston Globe, 9 October 1996, p. A5; See also Marguerite Feitlowitz, A
Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9-11;
Frederick H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on Terrorism
(Atlanta: Clarity Press, Inc., 2004), 93-108.
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is not to suggest that such assessments of the U.S. role in the development of Argentina’s
counterinsurgency doctrine are unmerited or unjust. Obscuring and overlooking the influence of
other external factors, as do many of those writing about the dirty war, undermines the
objectivity of such research.3
Most importantly, the emphasis on the role of the SOA fails to answer essential questions
concerning the primary role the U.S. played in the dirty war. How did the U.S. government
respond to the apparent widespread human rights abuses? What types of measures or sanctions
were used as incentives to enhance the human rights situation in Argentina? How did the junta
respond to these actions? Most importantly, how successful was the U.S. in curtailing the
atrocities? These are just a few of the questions this work attempts to answer.
Because relatively few people are informed about the dirty war, the second chapter,
“Anatomy of a Dirty War,” presents a general overview of the Argentine crisis and places the
dirty war within its historical context. Between 1976 and 1982, Argentine society was the victim
of an indiscriminate war waged by the military against guerrilla forces. The Dirty War resulted
in the abduction, torture, and murder of thousands of innocent civilians who had no connection
to the rebel forces the military was attempting to eradicate. This is the situation the
administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan confronted.
The third chapter, “Argentina as a Pariah,” details the policies Carter adopted to improve
the status of human rights in Argentina between 1977 and 1980. The Carter administration
adopted a strictly revisionist foreign policy that, for the first time, propelled human rights to the

3

The influence of the French on Argentina’s dirty war came to light in 2001 following an investigation by
the French government into the role of special forces in the Algerian War. For excerpts from the report, see Cesar
Chelala, “The French Connection in the Export of Torture,” The International Herald Tribune, 22 June 2001, p. 9;
Susan Bell, “French Taught Argentines How to Torture,” The Scotsman, 15 June 2001, p. 12.
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forefront of American foreign policy. Perhaps nowhere else was this policy challenged so
strongly as in Argentina. The result was a marked deterioration of bilateral relations
The fourth chapter, “The 1980 Grain Embargo Negotiations,” details the grain embargo
of 1980, which represents the primary argument in this work. The grain embargo, launched by
Carter in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, did not have the intended result
of severely punishing the Soviets primarily because Argentina refused to participate. While
Argentina most likely would not have joined the embargo in any case due to economic necessity,
it is doubtful that it would have cut exports to all traditional trade partners in order to replace as
much of the lost grain the Soviets needed had not the Carter administration, from the Argentine
junta’s viewpoint, openly provoked and alienated their country.
The fifth chapter, “Revision, Realism, and Reagan,” addresses how the policies pursued
by the new administration of Ronald Reagan continued the policies pursued by Jimmy Carter
during his final year in office. Reagan brought a strictly counter-revisionist foreign policy,
similar to that pursued by the U. S. in the 1950s, which was nearly devoid of human rights
considerations. Reagan also moved quickly to improve bilateral relations with the Argentine
junta until their invasion of the Falklands. Ironically, starting from opposing points and
operating under differing ideologies, both administrations ended with roughly the same foreign
policy, imposing heavy sanctions on the Argentine junta.
This work does not represent an attempt to either condemn or condone either
administration. Rather, the objective is to outline a wider basis from which to better understand
the policies pursued by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan towards Argentina and, perhaps, to
establish a broader understanding of the foreign policies of both administrations. Likewise, a

10

conscientious decision was made to allow the participants to speak for themselves; much of what
has been written or said by those individuals involved has been included where appropriate.
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CHAPTER 2
ANATOMY OF A DIRTY WAR

On 9 December 1985, Jorge Rafael Videla, the former president of Argentina and
commander in chief of the Argentine army, stood before the Federal Court of Criminal Appeals
in Buenos Aires. Alongside him stood eight other generals and admirals who comprised the
three successive military juntas who had ruled the country from March 1976 to December 1983.
Collectively, the nine military members had been charged with the kidnapping, torture, and
murder of thousands of their fellow citizens. In all, 709 victims of the dirty war, some of whom
managed to survive, were chosen by prosecutor Julio Cesar Strassera to illustrate the brutality
and barbarism the military had unleashed upon Argentine citizens from 1976 to 1983. From its
beginning in April 1985, the trial was effectively the only story in the country, as Argentine
citizens were forced to remember the sheer terror that had encompassed their country during the
infamous dirty war. 4
Internally, reactions to the verdicts and the trial were mixed, revealing a country that was
both deeply divided and haunted by its past. Internationally, many observers still wondered how
Argentina, a country that had long been the most literate and culturally advanced country in
Latin America, could have become a land of sheer and open terror. Following World War II,
Argentina ranked as the eighth wealthiest country in the world.5 Its overwhelmingly European
4

Despite their convictions in 1985, all military personnel, including the nine generals and admirals that
comprised the junta, and guerrillas were officially pardoned under the Due Obedience Law passed by president
Carlos Menem in 1989 following a series of military revolts, collectively known as the carapintada revolts. For an
in-depth analysis of the trial, see Amnesty International, The Military Juntas and Human Rights (London: Amnesty
International Publications, 1979).
5

Feitlowitz, Lexicon of Terror, 4.
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population consistently produced the best scientists in Latin America, and it had established itself
as one of the most refined and sophisticated cultures in the world, whose accomplishments often
rivaled their European and American counterparts. How could a country so well endowed
become a land of open violence whose barbarity in the dirty war was unrivaled in Latin America,
even when compared to Pinochet’s Chile?
The exact answer to this question continues to perplex Argentine society and the
international community as a whole. The war itself not only represented the most brutal period
in Argentine history but was the culmination of a half century of ideological warfare that had
played itself out through successive military coups dating back to 1930 when General Jose Felix
Uriburu overthrew the democratically elected government of Hipolito Yrigoyen. From the time
of Uriburu’s coup until Videla assumed power in 1976, 19 different presidents and 21 different
administrations had occupied the Casa Rosada, seat of Argentina’s government. Nine civilianbacked military coups occurred within the same timeframe. Only eight of the 21 administrations
actually originated out of an election, with two of those elections being clearly manipulated and
yet another two presidents being appointed by the army. The average duration of these
administrations was little more than two years with one government in 1943 lasting a mere two
days. Only two of the 21 administrations managed to complete their six year presidential terms.
Between Uriburu’s coup in 1930 and the advent of the dirty war in 1976, civilian governments
were actually in power for 15 years, often only symbolically.6
Of the nine coups that occurred between 1930 and 1976, the ousting of General Juan
Domingo Peron in 1955 proved to have the most lingering effect and is essential to an

6

The phenomenon of consecutive military coups in Argentina has been examined in numerous articles and
works. For an exceptionally well written and concise examination, see Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: The
“Dirty War” in Argentina (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 3-5.
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understanding of the development of the dirty war as a whole. Peron, the dominant political
figure in twentieth century Argentine politics, was elected president on 24 February 1946,
claiming fifty-five percent of the popular vote in one of the cleanest elections in Argentina
history. The politics he used, collectively known as Peronism, were largely based on Mussolinistyle fascism Peron had witnessed firsthand as a military attaché in Italy. Yet what separated
Peron from both his predecessors and heirs was his inclusion of organized labor into the political
spectrum. During his tenure, he worked vigorously to enact laws prohibiting child labor,
establish an eight hour work day and a national minimum wage, and provide accident insurance
and a social security program for virtually all workers. Likewise, by establishing a base in
organized labor, he had not only broken the traditional alliance between the military and the
upper class, but he had also altered the balance of power in Argentine politics forever.7
While the military succeeded in ousting Peron in September 1955, his departure from the
political arena propelled the country into a new era of political instability. As Guillermo
O’Donnell deemed it, post-1955 Argentina became an “impossible game” whereby antiPeronists on the one hand sought to eliminate the Peronist Party or ban Peronist candidates,
while Peronist supporters, who constituted a majority of the electorate, made stable governing
virtually unfeasible. Peron’s supporters recalled fondly how members of the working class had
managed to acquire cabinet posts as well as several seats in Congress. Likewise, women had
been given the right to vote for the first time in the country's history while the lower class had
received subsidized medicines, free food and clothing, and numerous amenities. Above all,

7

A number of excellent biographies of Peron, also treating his policies are available. For the purpose of
this thesis, the author consulted David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsin
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), chapters 6 and 7; Joseph Page, Peron: A Biography (New York:
Random House, 1983), passim; Eduardo Crawley, A House Divided: Argentina 1880-1980 (London: Hurst
Publishing, 1984), passim.
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Peron had given a sense of dignity to the working class, the most cherished of all commodities
bestowed. Thus, all governments after 1955 fluctuated between failed attempts at co-opting
Peronism back into the political arena and eradicating Peronism as a whole. The primary
obstacle was that no other party offered any viable alternative to Peronism, resulting in numerous
parties being formed to a point that, by the 1965 congressional elections, there were 225 parties
vying for office. 8
At the same time, Argentina witnessed a surge of guerrilla movements in the absence of
Peron. Although there were failed rural guerrilla uprisings in 1959, 1963, and 1964 attempting
to emulate the Cuban Revolution, the year 1969 brought about a shift from rural to urban
guerrilla warfare. In all, six armed guerrilla groups emerged in 1969. By the mid-1970s the
People's Revolutionary Army, a Marxist group known by many as the ERP, and the Peronist
Montoneros represented the only remaining guerrilla groups still active, all other factions having
been eliminated or merged with the two. Within the span of a few years guerrillas represented a
greater threat to the country’s stability than the volatile political landscape from which they
originally emerged. In 1969, insurgents carried out a total of 114 armed operations. By 1971 the
number had risen to 654. 9
Faced with the increasing activity of guerrilla groups and economic instability, the
military once again sought a compromise with the Peronists in 1973 calling for free and fair
elections. While Peron was not permitted by decree to run for the presidency, the Peronist party
was allowed on the ballot. In May 1973 Dr. Hector Campora became president, paving the way

8

Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American
Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), chapter 3; Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol:
Armed Struggle, 1969-1979 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 15.
9

Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 27.
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for Peron’s return. After declaring general amnesty and revoking numerous laws enacted by the
military, Campora resigned, having served forty-nine days in office. Elections were once again
held in September 1973 with Juan Peron claiming sixty percent of the popular vote.10
Peron represented the last individual with enough authority to hold the country together.
It had been seventeen years since Peron had last served as president of the country. A whole
generation had grown with the myth of Peron and Argentina’s “golden era.” Yet, before being in
office for six months, Peron died, leaving his successor and wife, Maria Estela Martinez de
Peron, or “Isabel,” to run the country as the first female president in Latin American history.11
Isabel inherited widespread problems. Not only did she lack the credibility of her
husband, the former actress lacked the political intuitiveness, charisma, and imagination of her
predecessor. Beyond this, Isabel faced a serious economic crisis that once again brought forth a
resurgence in guerrilla forces who felt she neither understood nor represented the Peronist cause.
Although Isabel replaced her administration’s economic minister a total of six times in eighteen
months, inflation reached 335 percent in 1975 alone and was running at an annual rate of 800
percent by 1976. The public sector incurred a massive debt while the international debt reached
eight billion dollars. The International Monetary Fund openly refused to extend the country any
further credit. Prices for goods and commodities rose at a rate of twenty percent a month. 12
Within the eighteen month period following Peron’s death, fifteen hundred assassinations
occurred, equaling one death every eight hours. Likewise, guerrilla groups, coupled with the

10

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Mission of Lawyers to Argentina, April 17, 1979 (New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 1979), 4-5; Amnesty International, Report
of an Amnesty International Mission to Argentina, 6-15 November 1976 (London: AI Publishing, 1976), 7.
11

Frederick H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on
Terrorism (Atlanta: Clarity Press, Inc., 2004), 93.
12

Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 125.
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Triple A (Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance), a right-wing death-squad operating from the
Ministry of Social Welfare, accounted for an estimated bombing attack every three hours. With
the economy in shambles and a full blown civil war in progress, every sector of Argentine
society began pressing the military to once again step in. Considering the past fifty years of
instability, the intrusion of the Argentine military into the political realm had come to be viewed
as customary rather than unusual.13
On 23 March 1976, Isabel was placed under house arrest and later flown to a remote
mansion in the southern foothills of the Andes. Shortly after 3:00 A.M. on March 24, 1976 the
military junta, comprised of the three heads of the armed services, informed the nation that it had
a new government.14
The military junta brought with it a clear sense of purpose and a comprehensive
philosophy of repression. They titled their system as the Process of National Reorganization, a
ponderous but obscurely menacing label. The goals of the junta were to uphold “national
security while eliminating subversion and the conditions that promote its existence.”
Furthermore, they promised that Argentina would soon occupy “its due place within the western
Christian world.”15
Immediately following the takeover, the military declared a bank holiday and froze all
accounts. The stock exchange was also closed while Congress was dissolved. The building
where Congress had held sessions was quickly occupied by soldiers. All branches of the federal
government were taken over. Federal employees were replaced along with workers in provincial
13

Amnesty International, Mission to Argentina, 7-10; John Simpson and Jana Bennett, The Disappeared
and the Mothers of the Plaza (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 35; Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared
(Boston: South End Press, 1989), 12; Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 115, 127.
14

Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza, 33.

15

Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, 224.
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and municipal governments throughout the country while all political parties were suspended.
Trade unions were also banned along with professional and student associations. The active
members of the Supreme Court were removed and replaced along with the Attorney General.
The junta quickly attempted to control information released by newspaper, radio, and
television.16
Concerted efforts were made to attack subversion in the classroom. The junta assumed
that the school systems had become a harvesting ground for terrorism and guerilla sympathy.
Thus, several universities were shutdown altogether. One of the first measures introduced by the
junta was Order 572 which “permitted the dismissal of ‘dangerous’ members of staff, and
amounted to an instruction to purge the school and universities left-wing teaching staff.”17 The
University of Buenos Aires alone witnessed the dismissal of fifteen hundred staff members.
Entry requirements were tightened, many subjects were discredited altogether, and the
curriculum was completely changed. Educators in psychology were forced to teach without the
works of Freud and Jung, “political and economic sciences without the works of Marx and the
biological sciences without the benefit of Darwin.”18 The Encyclopedia Britannica was even
banned because it referred to the Malvinas Islands as the Falkland Islands. Together, students
and teachers represented more than twenty-six percent of disappeared persons accounted for in
the dirty war. 19

16

Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 127; Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 12.

17

Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza, 212.

18

Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 17.

19

Nunca Mas: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared, translation
copyrighted by Writers and Scholars International Ltd, (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux/Index on Censorship,
1986), 448; Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza, 214.
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Plays, concerts, and films were also censored. The junta openly declared that the war
they were waging was not simply a war against weapons or subversives but also a war of
ideological penetration. They argued that the war was about the tensions between culture and
counterculture, in a moment when Argentina was experiencing acute weakness in its social
controls. Therefore, the military claimed that the ideas producing the guerrilla movements
stemmed from the mass media. Thus, guidelines for unacceptable material came down from
above. The goal was to incorporate the cultural content with the proceso’s mission—“there
would be no contradictory or disturbing images, nothing against church, family, or state.
Divorce, abortion, adultery, wife and child and elder abuse all vanished.” All stories were
required to contain pleasing or inspiring images while stories about institutional or generational
conflict were to be avoided above all else.20
Books were also censored on a grand scale. In fact, book production, which had reached
31.5 million by 1976, plummeted to 8.7 million in 1979. Massive book burning demonstrations
were held at regular intervals. Many books were banned for their ideological content, while
books that contained Nazi and neo-Nazi concepts, like The SS in Action and Maybe Hitler Was
Right, were produced on a large scale and promoted by the junta. A number of citizens were
abducted because they possessed one of any number of banned books.21
Immediately following the 1976 coup, the press openly praised the military for stepping
in. The Buenos Aires Herald expressed the widespread view in an editorial on the 1976 coup:
The entire nation responded with relief when it was realized that firm hands have taken over the
reins of government … It is impossible not admire the style of these reluctant revolutionaries …
20

Diane Taylor, Disappearing Acts: Spectacle of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s Dirty War,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 11; Rock, Argentina 1516-1987, 228.
21

See “PEN Says Three Countries Worst for Writers” Associated Press, 1 October 1980, p. 23; Taylor,
Disappearing Acts, 11; Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza, 210.
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This was not just another coup, but a rescue operation. These are not men hungry for power, nut
men with a duty, which they have stated with seriousness. By their first actions, the country’s new
leaders appear to have won the confidence of the people …
The government’s laudable moderation in both its language and its actions has created an
atmosphere which gives the country’s problems a different perspective. The moral, economic and
social decline of the past year and a half is daunting. It will not be easy to achieve the country’s
renaissance but the first steps have been taken in the right direction. The junta appears to have
created the conditions in which it can expect genuine cooperation at home and from abroad.22

Soon thereafter, members of the press were forced to submit all political reports to the armed
services for criticism and revisions before it could be printed.23 On the day of the coup, the junta
issued the following instructions:
Anyone who through any medium whatsoever defends, propagates or divulges news,
communiqué’s or views with the purpose of disrupting, prejudicing or lessening the prestige of he
activities of the Armed Forces will be subject to detention for a period of up to ten years.24

Press director, Captain Alberto Corti, immediately drafted a set of guidelines known as “The
Principles and Procedures to be followed by Mass Communications Media,” which included
defense of the family institution, the eradication of stimulants based on sexualism and criminal
violence, and the elimination of all obscene words and image. 25 Soon thereafter, the military
introduced a more stringent control of information:
As from 22 April it is forbidden to report, comment or make reference to subjects related to
subversive incidents, the appearance of bodies and the deaths of subversive elements and/or
22

Buenos Aires Herald, editorial, 25 March 1976. Also available in Patricia Marchak, God’s Assassins:
State Terror in Argentina in the 1970s (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 212.
23

Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza, 233.

24

Jo Fisher, Mothers of the Disappeared, 25.

25

Telegram to Henry Kissinger from U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires entitled “Juntas Relations with Local
and Foreign Media,” Argentine Declassification Project [CD-Rom] (Washington: National Security Archive, 2002),
24 March 1976, p. 1 (hereafter cited as ADP with corresponding date); Simpson and Bennett, Mothers of the Plaza,
234.
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members of the armed or security forces in these incidents, unless they are reported by a
responsible official source. This includes the victims of kidnappings and disappearances. 26

The consequence of not following these orders was often death. Although journalists
represented only 1.6 percent of disappeared persons in the Dirty War, according to the National
Commission on the Disappeared, some 400 journalists were forced to flee the country while
several hundred more were officially exiled.27
By all accounts, union and factory workers represented the single largest sector of
Argentine society the junta targeted, accounting for thirty percent of the disappeared. Because
the Peronist base was so well entrenched into organized labor, union and factory workers became
the clearest obstacle to the junta. Unlike their military predecessors, the junta sought to
eliminate the ability of organized workers to protest or carry out “Struggle Plans,” as they so
often had in the past. On the night of the coup, a large number of factory and union headquarters
were occupied by the armed forces. Within a matter of days, the junta had taken over hundreds
of unions, revoked the right to strike, effectively banned the General Confederation of Workers,
the labor sector of Peronism, and replace union leaders with military personnel. During the first
ten months alone, real wages dropped by more than fifty percent. Large automotive plants such
as FIAT and Ford Motor were seized while employees were forced to work extended days
without breaks, often at gunpoint. Workers who participated in strikes were given a mandatory
six-year prison term, while those deemed to be instigators
26

Amnesty International, Mission to Argentina, 15.

27

Nunca Mas, 362-368, 448; Jerry W. Knudson, “Veil of Silence: The Argentine Press and the Dirty War,
1976-1983,” Latin American Perspectives 24 (November 1997): 93-112; Amnesty International, Mission to
Argentina, 15; Organization of American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina,
(Washington: Organization of American States, 1980), 235-237. See also Andrew Graham-Yooll, A State of Fear:
Memories of Argentina’s Nightmare, (London: Hippocrene Books, 1986), passim.
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received 10 years.28
For all of the repressive measures prescribed by the junta, none are worse than the
methodical system of kidnapping, torture, and murder of thousands of Argentine citizens the
junta deemed subversive. Yet, there were no formal criteria required for one to be labeled a
subversive. All citizens were subject to being “disappeared” because laws regarding what
constituted a subversive were so vaguely defined that virtually every citizen was subject to being
arrested and connected with subversion. 29
When the junta decided that an individual was to be detained, they immediately inform
the local police station so that law enforcement personnel did not respond to any calls in the area.
When required, the soon-to-be abductors would ask for a “green light,” often referred to as a
“free zone,” from the police. This was done either by radio or by parking for a few minutes
outside the corresponding police station or central police headquarters. The process usually
began by blocking off the street and sometimes the electricity in the immediate neighborhood of
the targeted suspect. As often as possible, the military abducted people towards the end of the
week, ensuring that a larger timeframe elapsed before the relatives of the person abducted took
any action.30
Once subjects were apprehended, they were blindfolded or, as the military termed it
“walled-up.” They were then generally placed on the floor or in the trunk of a car. The military
especially favored black or dark green colored Ford Falcons as their vehicle of choice for
28
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abductions. Nearly all individuals were subject to beatings while on their way to one of the more
than 340 pozos, or secret detention centers established throughout the country. 31
Upon entering the detention centers, most subjects were stripped of any possessions and
taken to a small room for “interrogation.” This usually lasted a half hour but often lasted for
days when authorities deemed it necessary. Rarely, interrogators found subjects to have no
association with the guerrilla movements and released them.
Innocent or guilty, all prisoners were subjected to torture. Upon arrival, they were
“softened up” by the guards. Particular attention was given to any areas where broken bones had
resulted from the assault during capture. Many victims were buried in deep holes with their
heads being the only part of the body above ground. Usually, such practices lasted until an
individual decided to talk, often taking several days considering few had any actual information
to offer. When they were finally taken out, “they were covered with insect bites, worms,
infections, and their own excrement.” 32 Yet, the majority of the disappeared were simply beaten
to a state of unconsciousness by guards. “They stood me in the middle of a circle of people,”
recalled Luis Alberto Urquiza, “and I would be propelled by punches and kicks towards the
group, and from there back to the centre of the circle.” Such conduct could last for several hours
or until the guards simply grew weary.33
Often, there was a doctor who accompanied interrogators in the “operating rooms.” The
doctor’s responsibility was to simply monitor the victim and alert the interrogator as to how
much torture the victim was able to endure. A common method of torture was known as the
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“submarine,” whereby prisoners were hung upside down and dropped in vats of water where
they were left until they were on the verge of passing out. The process was repeated as often as
an interrogator preferred, regularly resulting in asphyxiation or cardiac arrest.34
The most common method of disposing of the bodies was to simply put them in large
graves with the marking of ‘NN’ for “No Name.” Virtually every cemetery had a quota of this
type of graves. Similar to the Holocaust, many prisoners were forced to dig their own graves
before being shot and buried, sometimes before they had expired. Gas was commonly used in
order to burn the remains or to make room for more bodies. Later, hundreds of mass graves were
found.35
Perhaps the most sinister method for prisoner disposal was to drop prisoners from
airplanes over the South Atlantic. Hooded and shackled, prisoners were called out by number
and given an inoculation shot. They were then loaded onto planes and given another dosage to
render them immobile once in the air. While airborne, prisoners were stripped of their clothing
and thrown out to sea. In 1995, former naval commander Adolfo Francisco Scilingo admitted
that he had taken part in two such flights in April and June of 1977. He estimated that thirty
prisoners were thrown out over the South Atlantic during the two flights and an estimated fifteen
hundred to two thousand total bodies were disposed of in this manner.36
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Despite the fact that disappearances were widely reported and well known, human rights
abuses did not lead to any large public outcry within Argentine society. Rather, it was the
inability of the junta to deliver on the promise of economic stability that caused society to react.
When the military came to power there were only enough funds in the treasury to last another
week. However, after the coup, foreign countries began pouring money into Argentina. The
junta relied heavily on the injection of foreign investments to promote economic development.
Despite this, most of the public, understanding the vulnerability of the economy and taking
advantage of high interest rates to make a quick profit, invested their money in short-term
deposits as opposed to fixed investments. The result of this was a spiraling foreign debt that
stood at nineteen billion dollars at the beginning of 1980, and ballooned to thirty-nine billion by
1982. In 1974, total debt in Argentina was equal to 5.6 percent of the budget, but by 1982 the
debt rate alone had risen to consume 37.1 percent of the budget and consumed the equivalent of
fifteen percent of the gross domestic product. Argentina’s economy deteriorated to the point
where debt service costs alone exceeded the countries total export earnings in 1982.37
Adding to the economic problems was the fact that domestic interest rates were so high
that it became impossible for national industry to compete with foreign producers at home. By
1979, imports were growing three times faster than exports. The proportion of industrial
production in GNP fell from thirty-two percent in 1976 to twenty-eight percent in 1983.
Between the years of 1979 and 1980, the number of bankruptcies increased by seventy-four
percent. In fact, more than forty banks and investment firms went bankrupt in a one-year period.
In 1980, four of the countries most important financial institutions collapsed as investors failed
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to meet their repayment obligations and depositors transferred their funds abroad, plunging the
military’s monetarist policies into crisis. In the same year a company called Sasetru, the largest
grain and food-producing company in Argentina, went out of business. 38
These problems, coupled with the closing of the local banks and investment houses,
resulted in thousands of unemployed civilians. The number of workers in the manufacturing
sector alone fell from 1,165,000 in 1975 to 740,000 in 1982 (a loss of 425,000 jobs). A study by
multinational companies found that fifteen percent of the urban labor force was unemployed.
Labor spokesmen argue that the reduction of working hours for those in employment was the
equivalent of another eight percent. By 1982, more than twenty-two percent of the nation’s
households were considered poor compared to eight percent in 1980.39
Faced with an ailing economy, the junta was on the verge of collapse. Riots occurred
throughout the country as Argentine citizens demanded free and open elections and the return to
democracy. Soon, the military invaded the Falkland Islands, known to Argentines as the
Malvinas, in an attempt to distract society from the economic problems at home and to put an
end to their long-standing dispute with Britain. Only two months after the outbreak of war
Leopoldo Galtieri, the junta president, announced Argentina’s surrender to the British. Defeat in
the Malvinas War ultimately cost the junta all bargaining power. Two days later, on 17 June,
Galtieri resigned his post and the junta was replaced by a provisional government that pledged to
hold elections. In the aftermath, a return to democracy was simply unavoidable.
Since the end of the Dirty War, numerous scholars and human rights groups have tried to
estimate the number of disappeared. CONADEP, the Argentine National Commission for the
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Dissappeared, documented 8,960 cases. Approximately three thousand more cases have been
documented since the commission reported its results, bringing the total of documented
disappearances to roughly twelve thousand. In addition to this figure, there are a number of
individuals who have never come forward with information. From the data presently available,
the total number of disappeared is most likely to be in the area of fifteen thousand. And by
adding in those individuals killed by the Triple A or guerrilla groups, the total number of victims
in the dirty war era most likely totaled twenty-five to thirty thousand people.
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CHAPTER 2
ARGENTINA AS A PARIAH

More than nine months after the military junta deposed Isabel Peron and initiated the dirty war,
Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency of the United States. From the moment of his inauguration, the
significance of human rights violations received a high place in American foreign policy. The
perception within the administration that the Soviet threat had subsided rendered the probability that
U.S. foreign policy could come to represent an extension of American domestic cultural and political
values. Alongside Guatemala, Argentina served not only as a testing ground for Carter’s foreign policy,
but also the country most often targeted.
While Carter’s foreign policy for the first time brought the issue of human rights to the forefront
of American diplomacy, his approach was partly coupled with a desire to restore the American public’s
declining faith in the U.S. government following the Watergate scandal, public revelations of
government involvement in overthrowing Allende in Chile, and the Vietnam War. Carter’s revision of
postwar foreign policy was made possible in part through the emerging appeal from the American public
for an expanded focus on human rights in the mid-1970s.
Under both public and congressional pressure, the position of Coordinator for Human Rights was
established within the State Department during the Ford administration.40 The degree to which Carter
cherished the issue of human rights and sought to promote it in foreign policy is best illustrated by his
40
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decision to elevate this new Coordinator’s position to Assistant Secretary of State. To fill this station, he
offered the post to Patricia Derian, a former nurse and civil rights activist from Mississippi who had
assisted in his election campaign. In one respect, Carter and Derian’s foreign policy concerning human
rights can be viewed as a mere extension of their earlier work in the civil rights movement.
The degree to which her beliefs guided the president’s foreign policy decisions and the influence
Derian garnered internally cannot be overstated. Not only did she have the luxury of being one of the
highest ranking women in the administration and the wife of Carter’s press spokesman, Hodding Carter,
all drafts of Derian’s statements regarding Argentina only needed the clearance of Undersecretary of
State Warren Christopher. Thus as the foreign policy of Carter began to be applied, Derian used her
authority to pressure the Argentine junta more than any other government.41
There is little doubt why Argentina became one of the most targeted countries of Carter and
Derian’s foreign policy. On the sheer merits of the case, the Argentine junta represented one of the most
oppressive governments in the world with respect to human rights violations. While a number of other
countries numerically claimed more victims of repression, one would be hard pressed to find a single
country whose brutality and open disregard for human rights paralleled or exceeded that of the
Argentine military.
Despite this, it should be noted that the Carter administration often demonstrated a peculiar
selectivity in terms of which countries received particular interest on the human rights front. The issue
was virtually nonexistent in U.S.–Soviet relations following a visit by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to
Moscow in March 1977, where Soviet officials made it clear that the issue of human rights could, and
most probably would, jeopardize bilateral relations concerning arms control. Despite consistent
evidence of escalating abuses on Russian citizens, the administration by-and-large pursued a policy of
41
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détente with the Soviets until the invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Frequent abuses by the
government of South Korea on its own people resulted in a temporary decrease of U.S. troop presence
there. The resolution to downsize troops was only momentarily applied as the decision was soon
reversed under intense congressional pressure. Likewise, human rights never received the
disproportionate attention in most countries in the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, as the administration
gave to the Argentine junta.42
Yet, despite such discrepancies with concern to a number of abusive nations, the approach given
to countries such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and Guatemala, were generally lucid and coherent.
At the same time, the decisions the Carter administration made with concerns to South Korea and the
Soviet Union only demonstrated the disparity between a theoretical approach to foreign policy and its
actual applicability in a practical situation. In retrospect, the decision of how to handle both situations
illustrated the diplomatic wisdom Carter employed with concerns to the national interests of the United
States. However, the move also placed the administration in the precarious situation of having to decide
whether to abandon its emphasis on human rights or to apply it selectively in a manner that compensated
for its lack of fervor elsewhere. Argentina provided one of the most relevant and logical countries to
pursue, considering it did not figure prominently into any foreseeable Cold War conflict and had a long
history of opposing U.S. efforts of Western hegemony.

Argentina as a Target

To combat the apparent widespread human rights abuses being committed in Argentina, the new
administration applied pressure to the junta through a number of methods. First, the United States
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repeatedly voted against loan requests by Argentina to multilateral development banks and continually
refused Export-Import Bank financing for Argentine purchases in the United States. Carter, his aides,
and the State Department frequently condemned the Argentine junta for human rights violations.
Likewise, the administration imposed an embargo on the sale of arms and spare parts under the
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment of 1976 to the Foreign Assistance Act. Finally, the United States
consistently championed resolutions against Argentina at the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights. As will be seen, the attempts by the Carter administration, as well as that of Congress, were
complicated and limited by the external forces of a global economy and internal pressure primarily from
the business sector.43
The earliest move by the Carter administration to pressure the junta on human rights came in
the form of military aid. On 24 February 1977, a month after Carter had been sworn in, Secretary of
State Cyrus Vance announced to a Senate subcommittee that the administration had decided to cut
military aid to Argentina from the thirty-two million dollars recommended by the Ford administration to
15.7 million. The decision, explained Vance, was based solely upon the deteriorating human rights
situation in Argentina. The junta responded immediately, proclaiming the measures represented mere
attempts to interfere in their country’s internal affairs. On these grounds the junta refused to accept any
military aid whatsoever in the forthcoming year. 44 The official response from the junta declared that
“no state, regardless of its ideology or power, can take upon itself the role of an international court of
43
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justice and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” and that such actions represented “a
deplorable abnormality in the conduct of international relations.”45 Only a few weeks later officials at
the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires cabled the State Department to inform them that:
High ranking GOA [Government of Argentina] officials are shaken by our action…We see no
evidence that they are prepared to cede to external pressures in the foreseeable future…They do
not comprehend how US interests possibly could be served through a violent takeover of
Argentina by armed bands of loosely Marxist or nihilistic Argentine youth whose leaders
originally were trained in Cuba. Although they have not asked for US material aid in dealing with
the terrorist problem, they feel that they deserve our moral support and not this unkind blow from
what they thought was a friendly power.
The casual manner in which the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] cut was announced…and
the apparent US double standard vis-à-vis South Korea…further wounded their pride and
heightened their anger…We have found high-ranking military contacts to be unusually and
brutally frank… [The FMS cut] convinced them that the USG considers Argentina unimportant
and a country which can be singled out for punishment with impunity.46

An immediate downturn in U.S.–Argentine relations followed the announcements. Not only did
the statements of Vance elicit condemnation from the junta, they were also criticized by the general
public in Argentina. In a meeting on 8 March 1977, between U.S. embassy official Kenneth Hill and
Mickey Alurralde, editor of the Buenos Aires based Carta Politica, Alurralde noted that the decision on
“military assistance to Argentina was received with consternation and concern in his country.”
Likewise, Alurralde questioned Hill as to whether the U.S. government actually understood that
Argentina was involved in a full-blown civil war. “American human rights reporting,” stated Alurralde,
“and public statements about Argentina were tantamount to interference in Argentine affairs. He stated
it would be easy for the government to fall back on anti-Americanism.”47 Likewise, the American
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embassy noted that “editorials this past week fairly uniformly played on [the] theme of anomalies in US
policy and defended GOA’s [Government of Argentina’s] defense of its national sovereignty.”48
Despite the political fallout resulting from the decision to cut military aid, the U.S. government
continued to pressure the junta. Shortly after the reduction in military aid was announced, the House of
Representatives discussed a proposal to prohibit all commercial arms sales and military training to
Argentina. It should be noted that the Carter administration actually opposed the proposed measures,
believing such actions might have adverse effects and further jeopardize U.S.–Argentine relations. This
decision was primarily a result of the political backlash the administration received from the junta. As
one representative argued, “President Carter had exercised the commonsense and wisdom that
acknowledges that there are limits to how far the United States can go in promoting human rights
without producing undesired results.”49 An intense debate over the proposal followed, resulting in a
narrow defeat by two hundred votes to 187.50
Although the House bill to prohibit all commercial arms sales and military training failed,
Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a nearly identical amendment in the Senate soon thereafter,
receiving the support of Frank Church, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The proposal
put forth by Kennedy not only sought to ban arms sales and training but also prohibited current military
contracts, aid, and sales established prior to its passing. Yet the Carter administration argued that a
period of one year was needed in order to influence the Argentine junta to improve the human rights
47
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situation. Argentina had previously acquired over $54.4 million of American credit, money with which
Carter hoped to barter. At the behest of the administration, Senator Hubert Humphrey offered a softer
substitute and engineered a compromise with Kennedy whereby all pipeline aid continued unabated, a
presidential waiver was permitted, and the bill did not go into affect until October 1978. After serious
negotiations, the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment was announced and the Senate version of the bill
quickly passed, formally amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and effectively prohibiting all
military aid to Argentina in the form of credits, export licenses, sales, grants, and loan guarantees after
the agreed upon date of 30 September 1978.51
Similar to the administration’s earlier attempt to compel the junta through economic means, the
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment failed to have the desired effect of improving the human rights
situation in Argentina. The embassy in Buenos Aires again reported to the State Department of the
military’s resolve, irrespective of whether or not the U.S. applied sanctions. From the perspective of the
Argentine military, the country was locked in a full-blown civil war. Thus, the consequences of
prolonging or even losing the war by relaxing current measures far outweighed any foreseeable progress
in terms of bilateral relations with the United States. Furthermore, the junta considered the issue of
human rights as secondary to the internal security of the country. Abuses and excesses were merely an
unfortunate result of the war itself and could not be curtailed.52
Considering they had little less than a year before the 30 September cutoff, the junta needed to
acquire enough essential resources to last until either the relationship between the two countries
improved to a point of normalcy, the U.S. backed off it human rights policy, or until trade relations had
been established with other countries from whom Argentina could buy equipment. The desire to obtain
51
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much needed goods and parts actually hastened trade between the two countries in 1977 and 1978. At
odds with what Congress and the administration had hoped to attain, U.S. government and commercial
sales to Argentina totaled $120 million worth of spare parts alone in the interlude period. At the same
time, the Argentine military acquired five Chinook helicopters, two C130 military transporters, and 15
Beechcraft trainer aircraft. Likewise, the junta simply found other sources of foreign credits and
financing or easily acquired funding from private banks in Western Europe and Japan. The United
States only supplied Argentina with approximately a third of its total military purchases in 1976.
Worldwide suppliers quickly rushed to replace the segments the U.S. government had relinquished.
Therefore, it was quite painless for the junta to obtain military goods through traditional partners such as
Canada, West Germany, South Africa, and Israel. To their despair, the administration and Congress
quickly realized that there were limitations to what could be achieved through economic sanctions in a
global market.53
Despite the lack in proof of positive results, the Carter administration continued to pressure the
junta. Before the end of 1977, the U.S. government had opposed all five Argentine loan requests from
the Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) totaling $304 million. Although American pressure did not
deter the loans from going through, it should be noted that Argentina was by-and-large the predominate
target chosen by the administration for blocking MDB loans. To place this in perspective, the United
States government totaled ninety-nine “no” votes and abstentions for MDB loans between 1945 and
1980. Of those ninety-nine, no less than fifty-three were against six countries in Latin America. In a
period of less than three years, the Carter administration voted against twenty-three MDB loan proposals
from Argentina alone, representing roughly the same percentage of the total negative votes the U.S. cast
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in a thirty-five year period. The only votes the administration supported were for loans that fulfilled
humanitarian objectives. Regardless of whether the U.S. voted against a particular loan or simply chose
to abstain, either decision was symbolically equivalent from the viewpoint of the junta.54
By mid-1978, the status of human rights in Argentina showed no signs of improvement. An
internal report from the U.S. State Department drafted in May 1978 stated that there was neither
“consistent movement toward human rights compliance nor any real prospect for a rapid return to the
rule of law.” The only positive note was an apparent decline in the rate of disappearances since mid1977. The progress of American diplomacy was summarized in the report noting that “US actions,
unsupported by other governments and private leaders and investors, probably cannot force rapid
changes in the present situation.” However, there was potential that the pressure exerted on the junta
was paying off when more than a month later the government of Argentina officially invited the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) to survey the situation in their country.55
The prospects for a stronger bilateral relationship dissipated as quickly as they began when
bureaucratic tensions in Washington reached a boiling point in late summer 1978. The controversy
surrounded the Carter administration’s attempted blocking of a major Export-Import Bank (EXIM) loan
to Argentina totaling $270 million. Due to overwhelming internal demands, the administration promptly
reversed its denial of the loan in September 1978. Yet, the controversy had devastating results in terms
of U.S.-Argentine relations and further exasperated the government of Argentina.
The details of the EXIM Bank loan are vague at best, yet merit further examination. In a joint
project, the governments of Argentina and Paraguay worked for several years to develop a hydroelectric
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dam on the Parana River. In order for the project to be finalized, the governments needed to acquire
twenty-seven turbines to be used to operate the dam. This required the building of a major plant in the
shipyard known as Astilleros Argentinos where the turbines would be developed. Among the numerous
companies who offered bids to build the plant was the well-known U.S. firm Allis Chalmers. On 3
April 1978, Allis Chalmers officially inquired to the EXIM bank for a letter of interest regarding its
willingness to support the firm monetarily if the decision was made to build the Astilleros Argentinos
turbine plant. 56
It should be noted that the EXIM Bank loan conformed to all U.S. government limitations
already placed on the junta. The loan request qualified as a non-military sale, served humanitarian
needs, and only involved a private corporation attempting to promote its services to a country facing a
serious energy crisis. Yet, from the viewpoint of the Carter administration, Argentina was merely
attempting to procure much needed U.S. funding by using the auspices of Allis Chalmers as a deterrent
front. The convictions of the administration were well warranted. It is clear that financing from other
countries, as well as private investors, was clearly available, particularly in Japan and Europe. Yet the
government of Argentina purportedly encouraged Allis Chalmers to approach the EXIM bank. 57
From the viewpoint of the Carter administration, the Allis Chalmers controversy was a test of
their resolve on the human rights front. Concessions in any arena by the administration held the
potential of opening the door to sidestepping the issue of human rights altogether. In a 26 June 1978
cable to Argentine ambassador Raul Castro, Cyrus Vance noted:
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Any prospect that we might have considered the EXIM bank financing apart from human rights
matters was eliminated by [the] insistence that the Government of Argentina looked upon
restrictions on EXIM financing as [a] political act and clearly sought approval of such financing as
[an] indication of U.S. acceptance.58

Derian, Vance’s’ deputy, latter admitted in an interview that she viewed the EXIM Bank loan as an
attempt to “break the back of her campaign”; the issue served as a crucial trial of Derian’s determination
to keep up pressure on Argentina regarding human rights issues.59
From this viewpoint the administration moved quickly to turn the proposed loan into a human
rights dilemma with the goal of gaining some form of compromise from the junta. The objective was to
offer a vote in favor of the EXIM loan if, in return, the Argentine military agreed to allow an official
visit from the human rights investigating division of the Organization of American States, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IAHRC). To further attract the junta, it was agreed that some
212 Argentine military personnel would resume joint training operations with the U.S. military.
The results from the “carrot and stick” approach came quickly. On 25 May 1978, after a full day
of consultations with officials in Argentina, Undersecretary of State David Newsom cabled Ambassador
Castro to inform that “favorable steps… [were] being taken in [the] human rights field in Argentina.”
Furthermore, Newsom authorized Ambassador Castro to inform president Videla that the decision had
been reached to once again “resume…military training.”60 Soon thereafter, the junta informed
diplomats that a decision had been reached to invite the IAHRC. Despite this, issues soon arose
between the military and the IAHRC concerning the specifics of the visit. In a meeting between
Ambassador Castro and Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister Allara, the Foreign Minister complained
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that that the IAHRC had proposed numerous questions that the junta felt “were offensive and
unrealistic.” Specifics about the questions posed by the IAHRC have never been disclosed, but what can
be observed is that the Junta and the IAHRC simply did not come to an agreement over the intended
visit.61
On 10 July Secretary of State Vance officially informed John Moore, Chairman of the ExportImport Bank, that the IAHRC did “not find Argentina’s invitation in a form it can accept.” He notified
Moore that “in View of this we have decided that we must recommend against Export-Import Bank’s
financing at this time of the Allis Chalmers application for the …Hydro-electric project.”62 Likewise,
Vance notified embassy officials in Buenos Aires of the decision but noted that Argentine officials were
to be informed that funding might not be opposed if it were privately financed. The decision was not
announced until 20 July.63
If the administration had been surprised by the protests that arose following FMS cuts, they were
certainly ill-prepared for the backlash that followed the Allis Chalmers decision. Thereafter, relations
between the junta and the Carter administration were defined by open hostility exerted by Argentine
officials. The story made front-page headlines in nearly all newspapers in Argentina. The decision
concerning EXIM Bank loans to Allis Chalmers was viewed by much of the Argentine military and
society as a public and formal accusation of their country. Likewise, the administration received intense
pressure from the American business sector which, coupled with the fallout in bilateral relations,
virtually forced them to withdraw their refusal to support the Allis Chalmers loan.
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In a highly charged discussion with Argentine officials in July 1978, American Ambassador
Castro was asked to explain why the U.S. government chose to “clothe itself with laws that are nonexistent, use these laws to our detriment and then keep telling us you are our friends.” The conversation
continued to be confrontational with officials demanding an explanation as to what “building a dam…
[had] to do with human rights.”64 In a cable to Vance in August 1978, Castro noted that he was issued
an official note of protest against the U.S. government from Argentina’s Foreign Minister. As the
Foreign Minister exclaimed, “the last incident of EXIM Bank denying credits to GOA is more than we
can tolerate. We consider that an intrusion into the affairs of a sovereign government.”65 In an internal
report Castro filed soon after the meeting, he noted:
This was my first outing in Argentina where I could sense a feeling of bitterness towards the USG.
I have covered most of Argentina’s provinces by now and the welcomes have always been most
positive. It became abundantly clear that EXIM’s Bank refusal to approve financing for
the…Dam project in Argentina has caused a wave of general negative reaction toward the US.66

At the same time, Allis Chalmers mounted a massive lobbying campaign in an attempt to have
the decision reversed. David Scott, the chairman of Allis Chalmers, informed the administration that the
dam project could be worth as much as eighteen million working hours for American workers.
Numerous other corporations joined in warning that such policies jeopardized current and future
contracts and their continuation would result in job losses. Internally, even members of the
administration expressed doubts as to the validity of the decision. Andrew Young, the Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, warned National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that the
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resolution with EXIM Bank loans to Allis Chalmers had set a precedent that would eventually deny jobs
to U.S. workers. Despite these moves, it was several months before the administration abandoned its
decision. 67
In August 1978 Patricia Derian was called before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to
discuss the human rights situation in Argentina. In her testimony, Derian stated that there was so “much
evidence of human rights violations in Argentina…that to argue about it would be a waste of time.”
Noting that Argentina had a serious human rights problem, Derian once again charged the junta with
“systematic tortures” and “summary executions.” While undoubtedly accurate, Derian’s statements
could not have come at a more inopportune time. In the already highly charged atmosphere of bilateral
relations, Derian’s testimony was the second “bombshell,” as Ambassador Castro deemed it, in a
relatively short period of time.68
The very utterance of Argentina from Derian’s lips had, for a while, received front page
headlines in Argentina. Yet, her testimony unleashed a furious outcry from even the few objective
journalists remaining in Argentina. Derian assumed the position of public enemy number one for the
following three weeks, claiming the front page of every major newspaper from La Prensa to the Buenos
Aires Herald. The Herald rightfully observed that “rarely have relations between the two countries been
as strained as now.” The official response from the junta proclaimed Derian’s statements represented “a
demonstration of regrettable irresponsibility of a high-ranking official,” and were rejected “not only
because of the clumsy distortion of reality which they imply, but also because of the use of false and
tendentious information which…is an insult to the Argentine people.” 69
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The Pressure Pays Off

No human rights situation garnered greater concern in Washington than that of Argentina in the
1970s. Yet it was not long before human rights advocates and a number of politicians demanded results.
How many lives were being saved? Had prison conditions improved? Was the practice of
disappearances declining? To answer these questions was merely impossible, primarily due to the lack
of available data. Disappearances, it could be reported publicly, were declining.70 Yet, aside from this
fact, few absolutes were available. While the pressures the administration and Congress placed on the
junta failed to elicit positive results on a broad scale, it should not be overlooked that some progress and
concessions were made by the junta, primarily the release of U.S. citizens and businessmen. Overall,
two important victories were accomplished in the field of human rights: the release of noted journalist
Jacobo Timerman in 1979; and the junta’s decision to allow the IAHRC to visit Argentina. Both were a
direct result of intense pressure from the administration and merit further attention in light of the
preponderance of disappointments witnessed between 1977 and 1980.
As discussed above, serious tensions were created surrounding the proposed visit by the IAHRC.
Despite the administration’s decision to decline EXIM Bank loans to Allis Chalmers, negotiations on a
visit from the IAHRC were still heavily discussed between the two countries as were the prospects of a
reverse decision on the EXIM loan. By September 1978, bilateral relations had erupted into open
hostility. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, Roberto Viola, retired general of the Argentine army,
70
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proposed a meeting between Videla and vice president Walter Mondale on August 31. Both were
scheduled to be in Rome the following week to attend the formal installation of Pope John Paul I. The
setting offered the perfect opportunity for high level discussions.71
On 4 September the two leaders met in Rome and came to an agreement. The junta promised to
issue an open invitation and work out differences with the IAHRC before 23 October. In response, the
U.S. agreed to withdraw its reservations concerning the Allis Chalmers loan before the 15 September
deadline for bids on the dam project. Furthermore, the U.S. pledged to reconsider certain FMS credits if
the junta continued to demonstrate signs of improvement. Videla assured Mondale that the U.S. would
“definitely see improvements in the human rights field.”72
In retrospect, the administration’s use of the EXIM Bank loan as an incentive was dubious at
best. While a deal was brokered, Mondale did warn Videla that, unless the IAHRC was allowed to visit,
the decision on the Allis Chalmers loan would never be reversed. Yet, corporate lobbying had turned
the tide of Congressional opinion to such a point that, by the time of the Videla-Mondale meeting in
Rome, a reversal on the loan was almost guaranteed, as Mondale was clearly aware. Thus, if Mondale
had attempted, as he had threatened, to continue to block the EXIM loans, the administration may very
well have been overridden by Congress. At the same time, bilateral relations had reached a climax over
economic sanctions and human rights. In light of this, it is apparent that the administration desired to rid
itself of the Allis Chalmers controversy without the need to mitigate its decision. Since the Mondale–
Videla agreement involved a private understanding, the Carter administration’s decision to officially
cease opposition to the EXIM loan and junta’s conclusion to allow the IAHRC to visit were not publicly
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linked. Likewise, while Videla was afforded the luxury of not appearing to have succumbed to U.S.
pressure, the Carter administration succeeded in interposing a regional organization viewed by both the
Argentine public and military as legitimate and objective.73
The release of Jacobo Timerman in 1979 was yet another sign of progress made by the Carter
administration. Timerman, the editor of La Opinion, was arrested 15 April 1977. His arrest came after
the death of La Opinion’s financial backer and former government minister, David Gravier. Gravier
was under investigation over the collapse of two U.S. banks until his untimely death in a plane crash in
Mexico in August 1976. Following his death, a series of investigations resulted in the discovery that
Gravier was connected to the Montoneros guerrillas who had previously deposited between twelve and
twenty-five million dollars into one of his banks. The guerrillas earned interest on this sum, that helped
provide monetary support for their operations. Thus, Timerman became a possible suspect because of
his ties with Gravier.74
Perhaps no single prisoner received as much attention by the U.S. government as did Jacobo
Timerman. He was held incommunicado for several months, severely tortured, and beaten until a
military court found him innocent of all charges. Despite the ruling, Timerman remained in prison by
executive order, although he was no longer tortured. In 1978 the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that
there existed no legal basis for his continued detention. The Supreme Court ruling was ignored and
Timerman was placed under house arrest for several more months before being allowed to leave the
country. In all, Timerman spent a total of twenty-nine months either as a prisoner or under house arrest.
The issue of Timerman’s status was generally, with few exceptions, the first issue addressed by
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Ambassador Castro to the junta. In their first meeting following Timerman’s release, General Viola
laughed when Ambassador Castro presented a list of two names, noting that he didn’t know what the
two could possibly discuss now that Timerman had been freed.75
Although hardliners in the military vehemently opposed the release of Timerman and, in some
cases, even threatened to resign, the international campaign—primarily led by the Carter
administration—on behalf of Timerman eventually paid off. The final blow came when Videla, his
justice minister, and all five members of the Supreme Court threatened to resign if Timerman was not
released. Although the decision was made primarily to stop condemnation of the junta, the military paid
a great price when Timerman subsequently published his powerful memoir Prisoner Without a Name,
Cell Without a Number, detailing his disappearance and torture at the hands of the Argentine military.76
At the end of 1979 the stage had been set for the grain embargo. While Carter’s foreign policy
alienated Argentina and bolstered their ties with foreign governments while often producing little or no
visible results, the administration had managed to elicit some concessions. With the advent of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and Carter’s announcement of a grain embargo, U.S.–Argentine relations
entered a new dimension literally overnight. Suddenly, the roles were reversed. The ball was in
Argentina’s court. Everything—the blocking of MDB loans and grants, public denunciations by Carter
and Derian, the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment, the Allis Chalmers controversy, and the Timerman
affair—played prominently into the decision–making process of the junta during the grain embargo
negotiations. With the newfound significance Argentina assumed during the grain embargo, both Carter
and then President Reagan moved to reverse all previous strategies and improve relations. Thus, the
grain embargo represented the turning point in U.S. policy towards the junta.
75

See “Background on the Timerman Case,” ADP, 18 September 1979, passim; Cable from Castro to Vance
entitled “Discussion of Human rights and Economic Problems with Gen. Viola,” ADP, 12 October 1979, p. 1-2.
76

Timerman’s book remains in wide circulation today.

45

CHAPTER 3
THE 1980 GRAIN EMBARGO NEGOTIATIONS
While Argentina assumed a minor role in the Carter administration’s foreign policy
objectives, U.S.–Soviet relations continued to dominate American national security interests.
Thus, when in October 1979, following a three-day airlift, the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan, the parameters of bilateral relations with Argentina were swept up in other, more
pressing matters. As will be seen, relations with Argentina quickly assumed a newfound
relevance to the Carter administration in view of events in the Middle East, prompting a
reassessment of the policies pursued in the previous three years.
Soon after the invasion, Soviet troops occupied the government palace in Kabul,
murdered their former partner, President Hafizullah Amin, and began occupying the remainder
of the country. Amin, leader of the Khalq division of the Afghan communists, the People’s
Democratic Part of Afghanistan (PDPA), was soon replaced by the head of the Parcham faction
of the PDPA, Babrak Karmal. In an attempt to establish a government that effectively controlled
anti-communist rebels, the Soviets formed a coalition between the two factions. In an effort to
moderate the reactions of Western powers, the Soviets cabled all major capitals in the Western
world stating:
We are responding to an appeal for help from the Afghan leadership to repel outside aggression.
We are responding with limited forces and for a limited time and as soon as the need is through,
we will get out. 77
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From the viewpoint of the Carter administration, the excuse was nearly laughable,
considering the man whom the Soviets claimed had pleaded for assistance had been assassinated
and subsequently replaced. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a grave threat to the
Middle East region and the national security interests of the United States. The Soviets had
rarely shied away from using its forces to maintain hegemony over the Warsaw Pact countries in
the past. Yet, this represented the first time they had used their troops to expand their sphere of
authority since the February 1968 overthrowing of the government of Czechoslovakia and
subsequent establishment of a puppet government under Soviet direction. Likewise, success in
Afghanistan gave the Soviets the ability to threaten the prosperous oil fields of the Persian Gulf
and further expand communism throughout the region.
Still, the Soviet invasion came as little surprise to those within the administration. The
State Department consistently warned the Soviet Union to refrain from intrusion into
Afghanistan’s internal affairs as early as March 1979. National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski told Carter in late July that “the Soviets would probably unseat Prime Minister
Amin.”78 And, as Cyrus Vance recalled, “by the middle of 1979, there were unmistakable signs
of Soviet dissatisfaction,” while Afghan leaders were clearly “ignoring Moscow’s advice.”79 In
his memoirs Carter recalled that, since May 1979, his administration “had been observing closely
the increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and admonishing the Soviets about their obvious
moves towards intervention in the political affairs of the small neighboring country.” U.S.
embassy officials stationed in Kabul cabled the State Department in late June 1979, noting that
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the Soviet removal of Amin from power was anticipated. Later, Carter noted that several
thousand military personnel were stationed in and around Kabul by September 1979.80
By September 1979, the administration recognized an invasion of Afghanistan was
imminent. Brzezinski notes in his memoirs that contingency plans were already being prepared
by September “in the event of an overt Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.”81 U.S.
representatives met with Soviet officials in Washington and Moscow no less than five times to
discuss the Afghan situation. Likewise, the cabinet had already begun finalizing contingency
plans and appropriate political responses to the invasion by 10 December.82
Despite this level of awareness, the first formal National Security Council meeting was
not held until 28 December. By this time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was virtually
completed. Yet, it was in this meeting that the first official reaction to the offensive was
approved. In his first response to the invasion, Carter sent Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
perhaps the strongest message of his entire presidency: “Unless you draw back from your present
course of action, this will inevitably jeopardize the course of United States-Soviet relations
throughout the world. I urge you to take prompt constructive action to withdraw your forces and
cease interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.” Brezhnev responded quickly, reiterating his
country’s promise to withdraw “as soon as the reasons which prompted the Afghan
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request…disappear.”83
Yet, the Carter administration was caught in a rather precarious situation. Strong actions
were needed, but an erroneous decision could have adverse effects on the region and in U.S.Soviet relations. With an upcoming reelection campaign in the works, Carter could ill-afford to
appear weak in his handling of Soviet aggression. At the same time, an overt response held the
prospects of potentially resulting in a full blown confrontation that would certainly have been
detrimental to Carter’s reelection ambitions, considering the Iowa primary was only weeks away.
The scope of sanctions the administration considered were discussed in a series of high
level meetings with cabinet members at the White House between 30 December 1979 and 4
January 1980. In all, forty possible sanctions and punitive measures were considered, ranging
from limiting Soviet fishing rights in U.S. waters to military assistance to Pakistan and Afghan
rebels. However, no one in the administration believed any of these actions would result in a
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Rather, they were intended to render the invasion as costly
as possible to the Soviet Union’s economy and international standing.84
The prospects of direct military involvement by the United States were deemed to be both
unnecessary and unfeasible. Yet, other considerations were less fluid and an intense debate
transpired internally between the National Security Council, which endorsed softer sanctions,
and supporters of hard-line sanctions within the State Department. Both factions agreed that a
swift response, coupled with broad measures, was needed. Prior to the discussions, both drew up
separate lists of possible sanctions. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the State department
believed that every punitive action possible, aside from a complete military standoff, desperately
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needed to be employed. Yet, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzeziniski and the NSC held
strong in their conviction that an overt reaction from the U.S. could seriously damage future
relations with the Soviets.85
By 2 January, the administration had agreed on twenty-six measures. Among the
sanctions were the following: suspension of scientific-cultural cooperation; covert aid to Afghan
rebels; suspension of high technology licenses to the Soviet Union; a request to Congress for the
deferral of consideration of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II); and consideration
for a possible boycott of the Moscow Olympics. 86 Two issues were not resolved: the possibility
of establishing a cooperative defense relationship between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of
China, including large amounts of arms sales, and the implementation of a grain embargo. The
issue of arms sales to China was easily overcome when the administration decided to offer the
Chinese a favored treatment in trade and non-lethal military and high technology equipment.
Yet, the issue of the proposed grain embargo quickly developed into the most
controversial subject debated in administration circles. The embargo negotiations were
complicated because of their domestic political and economic implications. Furthermore, the
grain embargo was limited by previous agreements on grain acquisitions made between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union. Under the 1975 grain agreement with the Nixon administration, the
Soviets were effectively licensed to buy a minimum of six million metric tons of wheat and corn
but no more than eight million tons without the approval of the U.S. government. Thus, by 1980,
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a disproportionate number of farmers and agricultural businesses had come to rely heavily on
Soviet acquisitions of U.S. grain.87
On the one hand, advocates such as Vance, Agricultural Secretary Robert Bergland,
White House Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, and Council to the President Lloyd Cutler
supported the proposed embargo on the grounds that the measure represented a test of the
administration’s resolve. Vance, who even went so far as to support registration for the draft,
recalled the negotiations in his memoirs stating:
There would be no quick return to “business as usual,” as was the case after the Russian invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The most important of the sanctions that were imposed was the
embargo on new grain sales to the Soviet Union. No other measure was as costly to the Soviet
Union or as clear a demonstration that the United States was prepared to accept significant
sacrifices to impose a price for aggression. 88

On the other hand, Vice President Walter Mondale led the attack in opposition to the
embargo. For Mondale and his supporters, the proposed embargo on grain would seriously
damage the administration’s political capital by its economic consequences to American farmers.
Hamilton Jordan recalls Mondale telling Carter, “Mr. President, we need to be strong and firm,
but that doesn’t mean you have to commit political suicide.”89
Mondale’s attempt to influence Carter’s decision certainly did not fall on deaf ears. In
his 1976 presidential campaign, Carter had promised not to impose any type of grain embargo, as
Nixon had attempted several times in the 1970s in efforts to stabilizing domestic markets, unless
the national security interests of the country were threatened. For many Americans, Carter had
87
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effectively promised not to interfere in the grain market under any circumstances. Furthermore
Mondale’s views were supported by the Department of Agriculture which released a study that
concluded that the implementation of such sanctions would not be detrimental to the Soviet
economic system.90
Despite Mondale’s opposition and the Department of Agriculture’s assessment, the
opinion of those who supported the embargo did not change. In fact, what most likely persuaded
Carter’s decision was a report compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency which concluded that
an embargo on grain would be severely detrimental to Soviet meat output and produce largescale economic problems.91
On 4 January Carter decided to enforce the embargo. As he put it:
How am I going to lead the West and persuade our allies to impose sanctions against the Russians
if we aren’t willing to make some sacrifices ourselves?
…God knows I have walked the fields of Iowa and know those farmers and realize that I
promised them in the seventy-six campaign that I would never embargo grains except in a national
emergency! But this is an emergency and I’m going to have to impose the embargo, and we’ll just
have to make the best of it.92

From Carter’s perspective, other economic sanctions would have a detrimental effect on the
Soviet economy, but the grain embargo offered the most considerable prospect of serious
punishment for Soviet aggression. Likewise, such a move demonstrated the administration’s
resolve and perhaps dissuade further aggression by the Soviets in the region and elsewhere.
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In a nationally televised speech from the White House on the night of 4 January, Carter
announced the full extent of U.S. countermeasures that would be applied to protest the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Calling the invasion a “callous violation of international law,” Carter
stated that no peace loving nation in the world could afford to continue doing “business as usual”
with the Soviet Union or permit them to “commit this act with impunity.” The grain embargo—
which effectively nullified the sale of seventeen million metric tons of grain headed for the
Soviet Union—represented the most serious measure he announced.93
This decision had a nearly immediate effect in Argentina. On 7 January 1980, the
Argentine National Grain Board announced a temporary suspension of new export licenses for
soybeans and grains until the situation had been clarified. The initial decision to suspend export
licenses was an attempt to avoid a run on agricultural products until the junta reached a formal
government conclusion on the embargo. The same day, Argentine Ambassador to the U.S., Aja
Espil, was invited to the State Department for a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for
Interamerican Affairs, William Bowdler, and his Deputy Assistant Secretary, John Bushnell.
During this meeting Argentina was first officially notified of the grain embargo, a full three days
after Carter announced the measure.94
Within the Argentine government, members of the junta including foreign minister
General Carlos Pastor assumed a reasonably open posture towards the embargo. Pastor believed
that adherence to the Carter administration’s proposed grain embargo better served Argentina if
the U.S. was willing to make concessions in terms of its human rights concerns and also a
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retraction of the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment. Yet he was opposed by other members of the
government, particularly Ambassador to the U. S. Aja Espil and Economic Minister Martinez de
Hoz. Both argued against joining the embargo on the grounds that Argentina had not received
prior consultation and had effectively been expected to cooperate under U.S. pressure. They also
argued similar sanctions in the past had proved ineffective and unsuccessful, intervention in the
grain market was contradictory to the current economic objectives and policies Argentina was
pursuing, and the junta was only beginning the negotiating phase with the Soviets for the
upcoming harvest. The internal influence both men garnered, particularly Martinez de Hoz,
eventually persuaded the junta not to join the embargo.95
On 10 January, the junta declared it did not support Carter’s embargo on the Soviet
Union. As the official communiqué stated:
We refuse to take part in punitive decisions or attitudes which were adopted without our prior
participation or which are taken in centers of decision outside our country…A feature of Argentine
foreign policy is not to use economic sanctions as a way to pressure or punish. 96

Until the announcement, the Carter administration firmly believed that Argentina would join in
the embargo. In any case, if the junta refused to cooperate, senior U. S. officials had been
assured that such a decision would not undermine the effectiveness of the embargo. Yet, as
Brzezinski recalled, the administration was, within days, “shaken by Argentina’s announcement
that it would partially replace the American grain shipments.”97 An unnamed State Department
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official declared that the administration “realized too late Argentina’s importance in the world
grain market.”98

Opposites Attract: Soviet-Argentine Relations

In order to better understand Argentina’s decision not to join the grain embargo, an
analysis of Soviet-Argentine relations is necessary. While relations between Argentina and the
U.S. deteriorated greatly in the three years prior to the embargo under the Carter administration,
the relations between the junta and the Soviets grew in a climate of mutual understanding.
Despite representing polar opposites in terms of political ideology, other factors figured
prominently into the development of Soviet–Argentine relations. It is also apparent that the
Soviets moved quickly to benefit from the downturn in relations between Argentina and the
Carter administration.
When the military junta seized control in March 1976 they inherited an economy in
disarray. The junta’s ability to combat terrorism effectively and completely to modernize the
military apparatus was greatly dependent on their ability to revamp Argentina’s economic status.
In order to achieve this objective, the junta rested its faith in economic Minister Jose Martinez de
Hoz, who was also the only non-military member of the government. A widely respected
economist, Martinez de Hoz employed an orthodox liberal economic strategy that sought to free
market forces, with the exception of labor, and open the economy to both foreign investments
and competition. Yet, two conditions needed to be met for his plan to enjoy widespread success:
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(1) the curtailing of inflation by freezing wages and (2) improvising the payments balance by
encouraging export volume and attracting foreign investment from abroad.
Thus, while locked in a fierce struggle with Marxist-inspired guerrillas, severing
economic ties with socialist and communist countries was simply incompatible with Argentina’s
economic objectives. Therefore, the junta consistently refrained from publicly denouncing leftist
countries, particularly the U.S.S.R. Likewise, the Argentine Communist party openly supported
the junta in return for preferential treatment during the dirty war. Indeed, the Argentine
Communist Party was one of the relatively few official parties the junta refrained from
banning.99
While U.S.–Argentine relations turned to open hostility over the Kennedy–Humphrey
Amendment and the blocking of MDB loans, the Soviet Union quickly moved to capitalize on
the decline between the two countries. In 1978 trading relations between Argentina and the
USSR developed in a climate of mutual agreement. Export volume from Argentina grew by over
fifty percent, resulting in a 174 million dollar increase in sales over the previous year. Economic
relations between Argentina and the Soviet Union continued to grow in 1979. While Argentine
exports amounted to $455 million to the Soviet Union, the increase represented only seventy
million dollars more than the previous year. Ironically, with concern to the grain embargo, the
most significant drop in Argentine exports was in the grain market, particularly wheat that
declined by 109,000 tons. 100
Another area in which the Soviet Union moved to take advantage of declining U.S.–
Argentine relations was in the field of energy, particularly nuclear energy. During the late 1970s
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and early 1980s, Argentina was the leading country in Latin America in terms of nuclear
capabilities. It was the only country in Latin America boasting an operating nuclear power
reactor, fuel fabrication facility, and a heavy water production facility. With vast amounts of
uranium available, it was only logical that the Argentine government pursued a broader
implementation of nuclear energy. The junta desired the enhancement of their nuclear
capabilities into nuclear weaponry as part of their goal to modernize the military apparatus
completely. Yet, the junta was hampered by a 1967 agreement signed during the Ogania regime
legally obligating Argentina to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America, commonly referred to as the Tlatelolco Treaty, originally promoted by the U.S. and the
International Atomic Energy Agency with the objective of establishing a nuclear-weaponry-free
zone in Latin America. In 1977, the junta was faced with the decision to resume their
participation in the Tlatelolco Treaty and openly refused to do so. 101
Perhaps the junta’s decision not to resume cooperation in the Tlateloclo Treaty alone did
not cause deep suspicion from the Carter administration. Yet, a second nuclear power plant was
due to be completed in May 1981 by a Canadian firm. In addition, from 1977 to 1979 the junta
was taking bids on the building of a third reactor using heavy water. Following the Allis
Chalmers controversy, the junta awarded the contract for the third reactor to a West Germany
company, accompanied with an agreement with a Swiss firm to build a heavy water production
plant. Although Argentina produced as much as three tons of heavy water yearly, this amount
was insufficient. The U.S. objected to the building of the heavy water plant because heavy water
constituted sensitive technology that could be used as part of a fuel system leading to the
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production of plutonium and, possibly, atomic weaponry. Under pressure from the Carter
administration, Germany refused to grant an export license to the German company contracted to
construct the third heavy water reactor.102
As early as August 1979, the Soviet Union had held high-level discussions with
Argentine officials. On 24 August, a Soviet military delegation arrived at Ezeiza International
Airport in Argentina, headed by Lieutenant general Ivan Brayko. Accompanied by two colonels
from the Defense Ministry, Brayko conducted discussions with Viola and Videla during the
three-day stay. Thereafter, Argentine officials visited Moscow in September 1979 and toured
Soviet nuclear facilities.103
At the same time, the Soviet Union consistently voted alongside Argentina in
international forums. Although less important in terms of actual results, the Soviet voting
alignment with Argentina garnered considerable admiration within the junta. Initial reports of
human rights abuses in Argentina merited very little response from the Soviet Union. However,
by 1977 it is evident that the Soviets were maneuvering to curtail condemnation of the junta’s
appalling human rights record. In March and August 1977, the Soviets provided the determining
vote in keeping Argentina from being officially cited for gross human rights violations by the
United Nation’s human rights commission. This measure would have designated Argentina as a
country to be investigated by the United Nations.104

102

See, Juan de Onis, “4 Years after the Coup, Argentina is Regaining Favor,” New York Times, 26 March
1980, sec. A, p. 2; John R. Redick, “The Tlatelolco Regime and Nonproliferation in Latin America,” 117-120.
103

“Argentina to Russia with Love,” Latin America Political Report, 21 September 1979, p. 293;
“Argentine Military Delegation to the USSR,” British Broadcasting Corporation Summary of World Broadcasts, 7
September 1979, sec. V, p. 6213; “Soviet Military Delegation to Argentina,” British Broadcasting Corporation
Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 August 1979, sec. SU, p. 6202; Juan de Onis, “4 Years After the Coup, Argentina
is Regaining Favor,” New York Times, 26 March 1980, sec. A, p. 2; John R. Redick, “The Tlatelolco Regime and
Nonproliferation in Latin America,” 117-120.
104

Vacs, Discreet Partners, 74.

58

The United States voted against the junta on both occasions. The Soviet Union’s
continued support for Argentina served as a catalyst for further development of relations between
both countries, while the voting of the U.S. only assisted in promoting hostilities in U.S.–
Argentine relations. In a meeting in 1977, Argentine officials told American embassy
representatives that they were highly impressed when the Soviets came to their aid and that
“Argentina had been saved by the Soviet Union when the U.S.S.R. cast its vote in a three to two
break on whether Argentina should be cited for its human rights violations.”105
Following Carter’s announcement of sanctions on 4 January, the Soviet Union quickly
moved to break the grain embargo by pressuring the Argentine military. A high-level Soviet
delegation sent to Argentine soon after Carter’s address warned the junta “that if the Argentines
did not sell grain…they would remove their technical and terminate their assistance and
equipment.” Likewise, the Soviet’s warned that nuclear cooperation and trade incentives would
be ended in the result of Argentina’s willingness to support such sanctions.106
The grain embargo effectively offered Argentina the decision to join with the United
States and continue the status quo relationship of hostility and alienation or to expand their
cordial relationship with the Soviet Union. In retrospect, there was little decision to be made. A
continued relationship of antagonism with no prospects for improvement with the former was
easily offset by the potential economic gains that could be accomplished with the later.
Essentially, the Carter administration offered the single greatest incentive for a burgeoning
relationship between Argentina and the Soviet Union.
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Carter Rethinks

Having officially declared the grain embargo and subsequently realized that it was not
effective without support from Argentina, the Carter administration was thrust into a rather
difficult situation. Politically, the administration could not afford to suddenly withdraw its
decision less than a month after declaring the embargo. Likewise, the embargo was useless
without the backing of all major grain exporters in the Western hemisphere, particularly
Argentina and Brazil. Theoretically, the combined grain output of both countries had the
potential of replacing as much as fourteen million of the seventeen million metric tons the Carter
administration banned.107
Yet, because of their public stance during the preceding three years on human rights, the
Carter administration did not have the flexibility to suddenly appear passive with Argentina on
the human rights front. Still, better relations between the two countries were desperately needed
if Argentina was to ever join in the embargo. Human rights, it should be noted, continued to be
of primary concern in bilateral discussions. However, following the attempted grain embargo,
the dynamics of the issue were changed drastically. Public condemnation of the junta no longer
played a prominent role. Rather, quiet diplomacy behind the scenes was preferred.
Carter immediately tried to entice Argentina into attending a multilateral conference on
the embargo in Washington. Customary diplomatic channels and contacts between the
Argentine Foreign Ministry and the State Department were deemed useless, given the fact the
Washington conference on the grain embargo was only two days away. A personal letter from
Carter to Videla was quickly drafted in an attempt to persuade the junta to reconsider. In the
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letter, Carter stated that all countries could not afford to persist in having “business as usual with
the Soviet Union” and that he held no doubts as to Argentina’s consideration of “measures in
response to Soviet aggression.”108
The letter did not have the desired effect. The following day, 12 January, the Argentine
president of the National Grain Board declared that his country was still firm in their decision to
sell grain to the Soviet Union and refused to actively participate in economic sanctions. Export
representatives eventually reached a final agreement stating:
There is general agreement among the export representatives here that their governments would
not directly or indirectly replace the grains that would have been shipped to the Soviet Union prior
to the actions announced by President Carter.
Regarding this issue the public statement of the Government of Argentina is well-known.
Nevertheless, in this meeting the Delegation of Argentina has stated that in no case does the
government of Argentina intend to take trade advantages from the present international situation.
Neither will it seek to alter artificially the current demands of the different markets. 109

As can be seen, the public statement issued was both convoluted and confusing, leading
to any number of interpretations of the junta’s official policy. Some felt that the opening three
sentences of the statement expressed Argentina’s willingness to support the embargo. Yet, this
analysis was quickly dismissed when Argentine Agricultural Minister Jorge Zorreguieta stated
publicly that his country’s position had been “erroneously interpreted” and Argentina did not
intend “not participate in an embargo of grain to the Soviet Union. The final destination …of
our grain…will be determined by the market.”110
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Immediately following the fallout resulting from Carter’s grain embargo, American
embassy officials Maxwell Chaplin and Anthony Freedman met privately with Colonel Carlos
Cerda, the Argentine Sub-Secretary for Legal and Technical Matters to president Videla. Cerda
offered several points concerning the status of US-Argentine relations. First, he expressed his
country’s “annoyance over the US penchant for dictating…and automatically expecting the
Argentines to toe the line.” Likewise, he noted that his country desired an explanation of how
the U.S. truly viewed the government of Argentina. A desire for “high-level talks with the U.S.”
was expressed by Cerda, but it was desired that future discussions centered on major issues such
as nuclear cooperation, “not merely human rights.” Yet, the most significant portion of the
discussion centered on the grain embargo. While Cerda stressed his country’s anti-Soviet and
anti-Marxist posture, he claimed that “if only President Carter had telephoned President Videla
beforehand to enlist GOA support on grain restrictions the result would have been different.”111
Likewise, Martinez de Hoz, the primary economic policymaker in the Argentine government,
stated that his reluctance to join the embargo essentially rested on the fact that Argentina had not
been consulted prior to the announcement and had effectively been expected to follow the
lead.112
Despite this, Carter sought to persuade the junta. At the end of January he sent a special
team to Argentina headed by General Andrew Goodpaster, former supreme commander of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and director of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
The goal of Goodpaster’s visit was to begin establishing better relations between the two
countries and to promise the junta incentives in the event they decided to join in the embargo. In
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an internal report prior to the Goodpaster visit, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell noted the
need for increased consultations with the junta. Suddenly, the pariah Argentina was being
referred to as “an important and leading member of the Western system.” Bushnell noted that
“General Goodpaster should make clear that our objective is not one of public censure,” and
stressed the importance of enhancing “previously existing ties through visits, increased personnel
exchanges, and consultations between the services.”113
Goodpaster arrived in Buenos Aires 24 January and his mission lasted until 27 January.
During that time, Goodpaster, Ambassador Castro, and Claus Ruser, a specialist on Latin
America from the State Department, conducted high-level discussions with Martinez de Hoz and
General Videla. Argentine collaboration with the U.S. was asked on the grounds that the Soviet
invasion represented a grave threat to world peace and stability. Argentine officials questioned
this logic, asking “how does the Carter administration expect to get support from us, [when] it
practically ostracized us during its first three years in office?”114
On 31 January, Videla held a news conference at the Casa Rosada with the purpose of
explaining the discussions with Goodpaster. He noted that the United States had “offered many
concessions” while Argentina had not conceded anything.115 Another spokesman for Argentina
proclaimed that the Goodpaster’s visit illustrated the “extent to which the government of
Argentina can turn the global rivalry between the two superpowers to its own advantage without
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abandoning its natural allies.” Despite this, the Argentine foreign ministry noted that significant
progress in bilateral relations had been achieved during the visit.116
Meanwhile, U.S. officials were hastily reassessing American foreign policy towards
Argentina. Internal reports filed soon after the grain embargo illustrate a desire to seriously alter
the policies pursued during the previous three years. U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro’s policy
assessment, written exactly one month after Carter’s public announcement of the grain embargo,
stated:
Our present policies smack of coercion through denial. This pushes Argentina toward other
suppliers, including the Soviet Union. Our new policies must be aimed toward rebuilding
confidence, recognizing Argentina’s nuclear leadership in South America, complying with
existing commitments for uranium exports and continuing with successful cooperation in the field
of low enriched uranium fuels.
Toward this we must pursue high level, candid conversations expanded to the political
level, beyond the narrow band of technical people who control Argentina’s program. Our public
diplomacy must gain public understanding of issues involved.

With concerns to human rights, Castro noted that “there is little we can do to sway this, and our
open insistence that the regime change this attitude adds an extraneous issue: that of outside
pressure.” Public condemnation from U.S. officials on the situation of human rights could no
longer be tolerated. Likewise, continued blocking of MDB and other international loans was
self-defeating and only served to ostracize the junta further. 117 At the same time, the Defense
Department, the National Security Council staff, and the State Department’s Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs all cited the grain embargo and the “Soviet connection” with Argentina as
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“demonstrating the need for the United States to improve strained relations with Argentina” and
position itself to be able to exert more influence on the junta. 118
The Goodpaster visit was soon followed by visits from Deputy Secretary of Commerce
Luther Hodges in February and the former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Gerard C. Smith, from 24 March to 26 March. Yet, relations between the two countries
suffered greatly just prior to Smith’s visit. In February, U.S. and Argentine officials openly
confronted one another in Geneva during a summit at the U.N. Human Rights Commission.
Likewise, according to internal reports, an Argentine delegation was scheduled to visit Moscow
during the Smith visit to further discussions on nuclear cooperation with the Soviets. This
caused deep concern within the Carter administration because the U.S. had still failed to fulfill
the 1978 commitment to supply Argentina with highly enriched uranium. In a draft report
prepared for Smith prior to his visit, the State Department warned that “tensions with the U.S.
tend to isolate Argentina; complicating the regime’s search for closer political contacts…and
pushing it toward political as well as economic ties with the Soviet Union.” 119
Like the Goodpaster visit, Gerard Smith’s trip failed to produce any sound results. In
retrospect these high-level discussions were fraught from the outset. Although Goodpaster,
Hodges, and Smith conveyed a forthcoming shift in the Carter administration’s policy towards
Argentina, they were all handicapped by their inability to offer anything beyond optimistic
rhetoric. Promising the junta an improvement in bilateral relations and expecting them to accept
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such claims in good faith without any specifics was, from the viewpoint of the Argentine
military, a ludicrous proposition after three years of public brandishing from the administration.
What the administration lacked was substantial proof that a new policy on Argentina was
in place and an exercising of this policy in the public arena. By mid-1980, Carter considered
suspending the Kennedy–Humphrey Act, but the proposal was dropped in the face of fierce
opposition from human rights advocates and members of the State Department. Thus, three
years of restrictions effectively cemented Carter’s inability to offer practical concessions.120
In order not to appear contradictory, the administration noted that much of the change
towards Argentina was in response to the improved human rights situation. While the State
Department’s report on human rights practices confirmed this notion, the sudden change in
foreign policy was clearly not a byproduct of the situation on the ground, but by the junta’s
newfound international relevance from the grain embargo and the apparent failure of three years
of measures to punish the Argentine military.
On the last day of Gerard Smith’s visit, Juan de Onis of the New York Times reported that
The Carter Administration has begun a major revision of its policy towards Argentina. This
country of 27 million bought $2 billion worth of American goods last year, and is besides a major
grain exporter and an emerging nuclear power, with the most advanced technology in Latin
America.
The review began when evidence began to accumulate last year that Argentina’s military
authorities were restraining the worst violence by the security forces and bringing the antiguerrilla
campaign under centralized control. Fewer than 10 disappearances have been reported since last
July.
The United States effort to improve relations quickened after the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan …
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The independent Argentine foreign policy is presented by the military here as an
achievement growing out of internal order and economic strength. 121

Amidst the prospects of a change in foreign policy towards Argentina, Patricia Derian
threatened to resign and went public, telling the New York Times “there is about to be a major
policy shift on Argentina; a move to normalize relations and to end our official criticism of the
regime.” The situation of human rights in Argentina had become the single greatest issue to
defining her tenure as Assistant Secretary of State. From Derian’s viewpoint, any policy shift
undermined her attempts at enhancing human rights in Argentina over the previous three years.
“It is probably too late now for them to back down now,” proclaimed Derian. “If they don’t I’m
leaving, and I won’t say it’s for ‘personal reasons.’”122 Opposing Derian, were officials such as
Raul Castro, the American Ambassador to Argentina. Castro openly suggested that such
changes were not only desired but necessary, as cited in his policy assessment following the
grain embargo negotiations. In July 1980, he told reporters “we keep asking Argentina to do
things for us, but we don’t offer anything in return.”123
Despite the considerable discussions concerning a foreign policy change by the
administration, proof of such modifications never materialized, aside from the administrations
refraining from open condemnation of the junta. When Carter failed to win reelection in 1980
the issue was effectively muted for the time being, alleviating Carter from an inevitable shift in
foreign policy towards Argentina and a potential internal battle within his administration.
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In retrospect, it is doubtful that any concessions the administration offered would offset
Argentina’s decision, considering the grain embargo presented the single greatest economic
opportunity the junta had encountered in their tenure. Service on the country’s foreign debt had
reached somber proportions while grain sales to the Soviet Union had become the only supply of
hard currency. By 1980, Argentine exports to the Soviet Union represented thirty-six times the
value of its imports. Likewise, the grain embargo prompted Argentina to reduce customary
exports to other traditional trade partners such as Spain, Japan, Italy, Peru, and Chile in order to
service Moscow’s needs. This alone allowed Argentina to quadruple its sales to Moscow in
1980 alone.124
Likewise, the junta’s decision was made as much in an attempt to slight the
administration as it was out of economic necessity. While Argentina most likely would not have
joined the embargo either way due to economic necessity, it is doubtful that it would have cut
exports to all traditional trade partners in order to replace as much of the lost grain the Soviets
needed if the Carter administration had not, from the junta’s viewpoint, openly provoked and
alienated the Argentine military. An alliance with the Soviets was certainly not what the junta
desired having presented itself as a supporter of the Western world.
At the same time, relations between the junta and the Soviets had flourished to such an
extent that Argentina did not have the convenience of being able to turn its back on one of the
only countries that it had maintained strong economic and nuclear ties with and continually
supported it in international forums. Without this added dimension of strong Soviet-Argentine
relations, the junta may very-well have been inclined to join the embargo regardless of the
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present status of the relationship with the United States. In retrospect, it is clear that, coupled
together, both factors left the junta with little choice.
By the time Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the issue of the grain embargo
and relations with Argentina had conveniently been forced into the arena of partisan politics.
Likewise, America’s foreign policy shift towards Argentina during the Reagan administration
was not only a result of his election in 1980. If anything, the grain embargo marked the turning
point for both Carter and Reagan, and for Congress as a whole. While much of Carter’s foreign
policy towards Argentina was well intended and, for the most part, constructive, the embargo
clearly signaled the need for an alternative foreign policy towards the junta which, until the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, had been targeted with harsher measures than any other fascist or
communist government in the world. Likewise, by 1981 it had become abundantly clear that
such policies were counterproductive and endangered American relations with one of the
strongest economic and military countries in Latin America.
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CHAPTER 4
REVISION, REALISM, AND REAGAN

The U.S. presidential election of 1980 garnered considerable attention from the people of
Buenos Aires. Early in his campaign, Ronald Reagan openly criticized the significance human
rights had attained in shaping the foreign policies of the Carter administration. The vast majority
of human rights violations during the dirty war occurred during the same period Carter had
employed numerous sanctions in the attempt to curtail such violations. Thus, by 1981 both the
Reagan administration and the majority of members of Congress viewed conciliation with the
junta as the preferred instrument for improved bilateral relations, regardless of the current human
rights situation in Argentina.
At the same time, the grain embargo of 1980 signaled to many in Washington that a
change in foreign policy towards Argentina was seriously needed, particularly considering the
country’s newfound significance internationally. Early in his presidential campaign, Reagan had
condemned the grain embargo Carter imposed, stating that neither “Pigs, cows, [n]or chickens”
had invaded Afghanistan and “no one segment of the economy should be asked to bear the brunt
of American countermeasures.”125 Yet, with concerns about Argentina’s refusal to join the
embargo, there was little Reagan could do. The junta signed a five-year agreement with the
Soviets in July 1980 to provide them with at least 4.5 million tons of grain annually. By the time
Reagan began his presidency in January 1981, the Soviet Union accounted for thirty-five percent
of Argentina’s total exports with over eighty percent of Argentina’s grain going to Moscow.
Therefore, Reagan administration attempted to establish better relations with the junta in the
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hope that Argentina would once again choose to sell grain to traditional partners, such as Italy
and China, rather than the Soviets. Despite the Soviet–Argentine grain agreement for 4.5 million
tons, the junta sold the Soviets just over eleven million metric tons between 1980 and 1981.
Thus, the Reagan administration hoped to persuade the junta to divert the remaining 6.5 million
tons back to its traditional partners and provide a basis for continuing the grain embargo.126
Yet, there were other reasons that reinforced the notion for altering the U.S. approach.
For example, the State Department’s human rights report for 1980, released in early 1981,
clearly showed significant progress concerning the human rights situation in Argentina. A
change in the structure of the junta was also expected, with Videla, the president of the junta,
scheduled to resign officially in 1981. Fortunately for the U.S., his chosen successor, General
Roberto Viola, was widely considered a moderate within the Argentine military who openly
supported the establishment of a new dialogue with the Reagan administration and endorsed a
return to democracy in Argentina.127
The Soviet military influence and burgeoning relationship with Argentina had also
become a pressing concern in Washington. Only four days before Reagan took office, Argentina
purchased five tons of heavy water from the Soviet Union for the Atucha I nuclear plant.
Particularly distressing was the fact that the junta chose to buy from the Soviets because the
Carter administration failed to uphold an agreement to supply the heavy water. By the spring of
1981, the Argentine Air Force publicly stated a desire to replace its aging American A-4 fighter
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planes with Soviet SU-22’s. As one report from the New York Times noted, the “Argentines
would prefer to fly new American planes, but their availability depends on whether the Reagan
Administration” decided to lift the Kennedy–Humphrey Amendment banning arms sales.128
With a trade imbalance weighing heavily in Argentina’s favor by a ratio of thirty-six to one, the
prospects for an exchange of military equipment between Argentina and the Soviets was widely
understood within the Reagan administration to be in the works.129
Yet Reagan was thrust into a precarious situation on how best to approach the Argentine
situation. From the viewpoint of the Reagan administration, some change in policy was
required, considering a continuation of the policies employed by the Carter administration
assured that bilateral relations would never progress. Yet, if the Reagan administration appeared
conciliatory to the junta, they would be open to charges of condoning human rights abuses and
candidly attempting to perpetuate the same military apparatus that facilitated such violations.
Yesterday’s opposition now determined policy outcomes, while the preceding administration
conveniently condemned such policies as ineffective and regressive. The questions raised as to
the effectiveness of Carter’s policies during his final year in office quickly became mired in the
political morass of competing ideologies and political exultation.
Clearly the Reagan administration brought with it a strictly counter-revisionist foreign
policy. Reminiscent of the foreign policies the U.S. pursued in the 1950s, the new
administration simplified the context of the Cold War, rendering friend and foe alike easily
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identifiable. The moral superiority pursued by the Carter administration quickly gave way to a
foreign policy of East versus West, based largely on perceived threats to national security
interests of the U.S. from communist states. The Cold War had officially resumed at full swing,
and the new policy called for the “Brezhnev doctrine” to be met full force by the “Reagan
doctrine.” With an agenda based on a foreign policy of “cold war internationalism,” Reagan was
committed to reestablishing the global military preeminence of the U.S. while offsetting and
challenging Soviet strategic expansionism in the Third World.130 Unlike his predecessor,
Reagan’s foreign policy was completely devoid of human rights interests. With a political
philosophy based on the assumption that anti-Americanism equated to actual communism, the
new administration believed that all global conflicts and threats to the national security interests
of the U.S. were the direct result of external factors, most often attributed to the Soviet Union.131
Much of the foreign policy the Reagan administration adopted was molded by the ideas
of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the president’s permanent representative to the United Nations, who, in
1979 offered the definitive indictment of Carter’s foreign policy in the now infamous essay,
“Dictatorships and Double Standards.”132 The fact that Kirkpatrick, a former Marxist and
longtime Democrat, was able to transform her ideas into the bedrock of a Republican president’s
foreign policy was quite remarkable. Kirkpatrick represented one of the earliest examples of the
emerging “neoconservative” movement of the 1970s. Disillusioned by the foreign policies of the
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post-Vietnam Democratic Party—represented by the likes of George McGovern and Jimmy
Carter—this new breed of conservatives subscribed to the liberal position Democrats took on
domestic issues but were particularly hawkish with regards to American foreign policy.
In “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” the 1979 Commentary essay that first brought
her to the attention of Ronald Reagan, Kirkpatrick offered a scathing review of the Carter
administration’s foreign policies. The essay was essentially a critical examination of two
particular cases—Nicaragua and Iran—in which she argued that the Carter administration
purposefully undermined two authoritarian regimes that represented traditional allies of the
United States. According to Kirkpatrick, Carter’s policies served to both undermine the
governments of the Shah in Iran and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua while simultaneously
bolstering the “coming to power of new regimes in which ordinary people enjoy[ed] fewer
freedoms and less personal security than under the previous autocracy —regimes, moreover,
hostile to American interests and policies.” Thus, according to Kirkpatrick, these policies
effectively paved the way for the advent of a radical Islamic state in Iran and communism in
Nicaragua. 133
Furthermore, Kirkpatrick argued that authoritarian dictatorships were not static, while
totalitarian regimes tended to be permanent. Likewise, she asserted that most Third World
countries were not economically, socially, culturally, or politically prepared for democracy and
the United States should not, therefore, necessarily view liberal or progressive forces within
these countries as being capable to bringing about positive changes. There is no example, she
133
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wrote, of a “revolutionary ‘socialist’ or communist society being democratized,” while rightwing “autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies—given time, propitious economic,
social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for
representative government.” Yet, U.S. policy could be used effectively to “encourage this
process of liberalization and democratization, provided that the effort is not made at a time when
the incumbent government is fighting for its life against violent adversaries,” as was the case in
Argentina until 1979. For Kirkpatrick, all proposed reforms should be “aimed at producing
gradual change rather than perfect democracy overnight.” Therefore, the role of U.S. foreign
policy towards these countries should be to “understand the process of change, and then…to
align ourselves with history, hoping to contribute a bit of stability along the way.”134
While Kirkpatrick’s essay failed to cite a single reference to the situation in Argentina,
she was, nevertheless, widely considered to be an authority on the county’s authoritarian record,
having already written a book on Peronist Argentina. Thus, Kirkpatrick’s analysis of a gradual
turn towards stable democracy was seen as being applicable to the Argentine situation. While
the country had never demonstrated a great affinity for democracy, there were many
opportunities for gradual transfer from military to civilian control, such as military governments
calling for open elections in 1932, 1946, 1958, 1963, and 1973.135
Alexander Haig, the administration’s new Secretary of State, stated:
We told Argentina that it had heard its last public lecture from the United States on human rights.
The practice of publicly denouncing friends on questions of human rights while minimizing the
abuse of those rights in the Soviet Union and other totalitarian countries was at an end. The U.S.
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decided to vote for Argentina in the U.N. Human Rights Commission. We knew that the
Europeans would likely not vote with us and that there would be unfavorable press reaction, but
Argentina had dramatically improved its record, and, in our judgment, further improvement was
more likely to be achieved by recognition of that fact than by reducing one of the most important
nations in the hemisphere to the status of pariah.136

As much as Patricia Derian’s influence on the Carter administration brought the issue of
human rights to the forefront of American foreign policy towards Argentina, Jeane Kirkpatrick
was as much responsible for at least successfully removing the subject from the Reagan
administration’s public stance. In December 1980, Derian and Kirkpatrick, the two most
important individuals responsible for shaping American foreign policy towards Argentina during
the dirty war, faced off in a heated and memorable interview on CBS. The calm and measured
Kirkpatrick stated:
If we are confronted with the choice between offering assistance to a moderately repressive
autocratic government which is also friendly to the United States, and permitting it to be over-run
by a Cuban-trained, Cuban-armed, Cuban-sponsored insurgency we would assist the moderate
autocracy.

Perhaps owing to the sting of electoral defeat and the security of policy change reflected in
Kirkpatrick’s remarks, Derian’s response was more than usually confrontational:
What the hell is moderately repressive—that you only torture half the people, and that you only do
summary executions now and then?

The exchange offered a perfect example of the disparity in foreign policies the two
administrations pursued. 137
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The Argentine-American Alliance

From the outset, the Reagan administration identified three distinct areas of concern in
the Western Hemisphere: first, to secure Central America as a safe area for U.S. national security
interests by thwarting the spread of communism; second, to improve relations with the Mexican
government; and third, to reestablish a productive relationship with countries in South American,
particularly Chile and Argentina. With its strict anti-communist stance, the Argentine military
later figured prominently into helping the administration achieve its objectives in Central
America, particularly in Nicaragua and El Salvador.138
In the later part of 1980, officials from the Argentine military held a number of informal
discussions with some of Reagan’s top Latin American advisors. These negotiations centered on
the formulation of a new partnership between Argentina and the U.S. in the event of a
Republican victory in the upcoming November elections. Thus, it was of little surprise when
Reagan completely abandoned Carter’s policy of pressuring the junta and chose to move towards
an alliance with Argentina focused on the curtailment of communism in Latin America.139
The earliest move by the Reagan administration to improve relations with Argentina
came in March 1981, when junta president designate Roberto Viola was invited for a visit to the
U.S. During his stay from 15-19 March, Viola met with Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and a number of members of Congress. With the
exception of the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, all bilateral issues were discussed, including
nuclear proliferation, the grain embargo, and the possibility of Reagan asking Congress to repeal

138

Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade, 52.

139

Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade, 63.

77

the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment banning military aid and spare parts. Reagan made it clear
that he was willing to make use of a loophole in the amendment and suspend sanctions in the
interest of national security. In an informal meeting with members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Viola pledged to make more of an effort to identify some of the six
thousand reported disappearances. Likewise, Senator Charles Percy of Illinois pressed Viola to
back up its condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by joining in the grain
embargo.140
By all accounts, the visit was a great success both for Viola, who bolstered his status
domestically, and for the Reagan administration, which viewed the trip as a successful beginning
towards developing improved bilateral relations. As Viola stated after the trip, “I have
encountered an understanding that exceeded my most exaggerated hopes.” “The United States
government,” proclaimed Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion, after meeting with Kirkpatrick for
nearly six hours, “has made a decision to make progress in its relations with Argentina in the
most harmonious way possible.”141
The Reagan administration moved quickly to bring about results in an attempt to display
the new course bilateral relations would follow with Argentina. On 18 March, while Viola was
still making his unofficial trip in the U.S., Deputy White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes
told reporters that Reagan was considering a request to Congress to repeal the embargo on
military aid to Argentina. Testifying before Congress the same day, Secretary of State Haig also
140
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confirmed that the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment banning military aid was being reviewed.
“We are looking at the situation,” said Haig, “with respect to the provision of armaments to
Argentina now, but there has been no decision.”142
Immediately following the announcement, Senator Kennedy, co-author of the bill that
banned military aid, went on the offensive. On 19 March, Kennedy wrote Richard Fairbanks,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, expressing his concern over the human rights
situation in Argentina and the Reagan administration’s consideration of repealing the arms
embargo. Likewise, the same human rights advocates came forward against the Reagan
administration who had previously opposed Carter’s proposal to lift the Kennedy-Humphrey
Amendment following the grain embargo. Eventually, Carter had succumbed to the pressure.
Yet the Reagan administration was not so easily compelled. In response to Kennedy’s letter,
Fairbanks offered the excuse most often elicited by the Reagan administration for any change in
policy:
We have decided to repeal of section 620B of the Foreign Assistance Act [the Kennedy-Humphrey
Amendment]. By imposing blanket restrictions on the sale of military supplies and training to
Argentina, this legislation inhibits the accomplishment of our strategic objectives in the
hemisphere while not permitting recognition of the considerable progress Argentina has made
toward the restoration of due process and rule of law.143

In April, a joint hearing by the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International
Organizations and Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee was called to
discuss the President’s recommendation to repeal the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment on arms
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sales and military training. Another meeting was assembled by the International Development
Institutions and Finance subcommittee of the House Committees on Banking, Financing, and
Urban Affairs, to debate the Reagan administration’s decision to cease the blocking of MDB
loans to Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina.
During the April hearings on military aid, the consideration of whether the human rights
status in Argentina had displayed sufficient improvement to merit a suspension of the KennedyHumphrey Amendment quickly dissipated into the realm of partisan politics. The entire session
was devoted to a discussion focusing on the morality and expediency of the administration’s
policy towards Argentina, while ignoring the question of whether progress had been made while.
Much of the debate centered on whether it was suitable for Congress to take tangible notice of
the improved situation and, based upon this, if future progress could be expected by lifting the
sanctions on the junta.
Two witnesses spoke in support of the administration’s proposals, former
congressman James Karth, a registered foreign agent of the Argentine government, and James
Theberge, one of the more prominent economic consultants available with diplomatic experience
and a former U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua. From the outset of their testimonies, both men
clearly desired to shift the members’ attention to more pertinent issues such as the
ineffectiveness of the arms embargo, the current rather than former status of human rights in
Argentina, the loss of foreign sales and domestic jobs, and the pressing need to allow the
administration a broader flexibility in foreign affairs.
Karth, the first administration witness to speak, opened by stating a recent State
Department report citing “an equally marked deterioration of human rights in the occupied West
Bank, the Soviet Union, Cuba, South Korea, South Africa, and…Northern Ireland.” Despite this
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report, Karth noted that he knew of “no sitting member of Congress,” who was contemplating
any sanctions “similar to 620B…for these countries.” Karth continued to berate the policies
currently in place, arguing that Argentina had systematically been singled out in order to be
made an example and “had penalties imposed on it that…[were] far more severe than those
imposed upon North Korea, China, North Vietnam, and a host of other nations.” Finally Karth
claimed that an ongoing loss of American jobs, America’s status in Latin America, and political
leverage in Argentina, were the only results to be expected from the continued ostracizing of the
junta.144
Following Karth, James Theberge offered four primary reasons to justify repealing the
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment: first, the clear reduction in human rights violations that he
deemed “dramatic” since 1979; second, the sanction had been ineffective in inducing the
Argentine government to improve the status of human rights; third, the amendment had failed in
its objective of denying arms to the junta and, to the contrary, promoted arms production
capabilities and Argentine alliances with other nations, most distressingly the Soviet Union; and
finally, it was counterproductive and had directly discouraged Argentina’s cooperation in the
grain embargo.145
Patricia Feeny of Amnesty International, Orville Schell of the Lawyer’s Committee on
Human Rights, and Joseph Eldridge of the Washington Office on Latin America spoke in
opposition to Karth and Theberge. Collectively, they argued that the continuing issue of
disappearances, the large number of citizens being imprisoned without trial, and the junta’s
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continued refusal to account for missing persons as reasons not to rescind any current sanctions.
To bolster the argument against rescinding the sanction, Eldridge claimed that “every major
improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina can be traced to some form of
international pressure.”146
Congresswoman Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey argued that the Kennedy–Humphrey
Amendment was not a matter of foreign aid but a question of military and commercial sales.
“Whatever went to Argentina would be paid for,” she noted; “to refer to it as aid perhaps gives a
false impression.” Although Fenwick felt that a change in policy under a new administration
would be misinterpreted in Argentina—and that the Soviet Union expressed concern over the
continued ostracizing of the junta, which, she asserted, would continue to push them into the
hands of the Soviets—she felt that a change in policy under a new administration would be
misinterpreted in Argentina and the Soviet Union. “If Mr. Reagan had been President when this
embargo was imposed…then it would be clear that the change was being made because of the
changes in Argentina.”147
Yet, what was most surprising about the discussions was the emphasis on the grain
embargo, which dominated the debate. In fact, the grain embargo and Argentina’s relationship
with the Soviet Union was mentioned more by congressional members than the Kennedy–
Humphrey Amendment they were deliberating. As Congressman Pete Peyser of New York
noted “Argentina’s recent rapprochement with the Soviet Union…is due to our policies.”148
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While the dialogue was intended to focus on U.S. sanctions, the only figures presented by
Congressional members were several tables illustrating Argentine grain exports to the Soviet
Union. Thus, it is apparent that the grain embargo became the single issue on which the
Kennedy–Humphrey Amendment rested. As Congressman Robert Lagomarsino of California
stated:
While I…view that we should try to have an effective [grain] embargo, whether it is one or any
other one that we might try to install in the future, I think we might have a…better…chance of
doing that if we are at least talking to the countries we are asking for cooperation. If we have on
our books legislation that treats them worse than the country we are trying to embargo…it is very
difficult to explain to them why they should go along with us when we have not been going along
with them, even to the extent of allowing commercial sales.149

Amidst the flurry of partisan politics over the Kennedy–Humphrey Amendment, Reagan
compromised and replaced the bill with another law, Section 725 of the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act, effectively permitting a resumption of military training for
Argentine and Chilean forces and allowing the sale of military and commercial arms to the junta
when and if the president certified that significant improvement of human rights had occurred.
In political terms, the Argentine issue was a great loss domestically for the new administration
because it opened up opposition from former Carter administration officials who quickly
condemned the policy as one that gave both money and arms to torturers. While Reagan did not
officially certify sales to Argentina until the return to civilian rule under Raul Alfonsin in early
1984, the replacement of the Kennedy–Humphrey Amendment was symbolically significant in
terms of the administration’s desire to improve relations with the junta.150
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With domestic pressure mounting to the grain embargo and the administration’s inability
to coerce Argentina to cut grain supplies to the Soviet Union, Reagan decided to end the
embargo on 21 April 1981. Three days later he announced that, although still opposed to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and elsewhere, the U.S. was lifting the embargo on all
agricultural commodities including grain. Reagan explained his decision to lift the embargo in
July 1982, stating:
In the spring of 1981, I lifted the grain embargo imposed by the previous administration because it
was not having the desired effect of seriously penalizing the Soviet Union...[Increased sales by
other suppliers] substantially undercut the tremendous sacrifices of our farmers, and I vowed at the
time not to impose a grain embargo unilaterally unless it was part of a general cutoff of trade
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.151

Another area that the Reagan administration used to improve relations was in supporting
Multinational Development Bank loans. Similar to the policies pursued by Carter during the last
year of his presidency, the Reagan administration consistently voted in favor of loans to
Argentina. Once again, the new administration justified these actions on the grounds that there
had been consistent human rights improvements and that such progress should be recognized.
As an internal document stated, the administration felt that “more will be gained for human
rights by recognizing improvements than by the continued public condemnation implicit in
negative votes or abstentions on MDB loans.”152
Central America, primarily Nicaragua and El Salvador, was, along with Afghanistan,
viewed within the Reagan administration as a significant area in redefining the role of the United
151
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States as a world power. Amidst the new Argentine-American alliance, the junta effectively
played the role of surrogate to the U.S. in Central America. The reason behind Argentina’s
involvement in Central America can be attributed to a wide number of constraints on direct U.S.
involvement. First, with few agency specialists available for covert action, the CIA was
restricted in its capacity. Second, the CIA was especially susceptible to congressional scrutiny.
Most importantly, Congress displayed an open disdain for any direct intervention that could
result in an open war in Central America, much like what had recently occurred in Vietnam.
In Nicaragua, the CIA was instructed to promote a counterrevolutionary army to combat
communist expansion under the direct guidance of Argentine military advisors. Thus, promoting
an indigenous army trained by another country provided an effective solution. Likewise, the
groundwork activities of the Contras, the counter-revolutionary army opposing the Nicaraguan
Sandinistas, were directed by Argentine military advisors while foreign aid was easily concealed
through assistance monies for Argentina. By early 1982, the Reagan administration had begun
formal discussions with the junta, as well as Columbia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile, about the
formation of a combined force to be used in the establishment of a military blockade of
Nicaragua and to counteract guerrillas in El Salvador. Yet, Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands
in April 1982 effectively ended the alliance with the U.S. in Central America.153

The Malvinas

Aside from the grain embargo, perhaps the greatest shift in bilateral relations occurred on
11 December 1981. Viola, recovering from a minor heart attack, was abruptly replaced by army
153
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commander Leopoldo Galtieri in a palace coup. Unlike Viola, Galtieri had lived in the U.S. as a
student officer. A staunch anti-communist, he had visited Washington twice in the preceding six
months. Only weeks before becoming president, Galtieri had visited the U.S. and met with a
number of high ranking administration officials, promising that Argentina was prepared to
contribute troops to Central America. Galtieri certainly felt he had forged a special relationship
with the Reagan administration, a fact that many attribute to his decision to embark on the illfated military escapade in the Falkland Islands.154
Viola’s replacement had grave implications in terms of bilateral relations. Only four
months after taking control, an Argentine expeditionary force invaded the Falkland Islands,
known in Argentina as the Malvinas, located eight hundred miles from Antarctica and having a
population of around eighteen hundred people and five hundred thousand sheep. Coupled with
the fact that there is snowfall on the islands approximately eight months out of the year and an
undeveloped infrastructure, the Falklands appeared to be an area of little interest to most
countries. Yet, the battle between Argentina and Great Britain over control of the Falklands
stemmed back to 1833 when Argentina claimed Britain took control of the islands illegally.
Argentina never relinquished its claim to the islands and even revived them in 1910 and in 1927.
Negotiations between the two countries began in 1966 and lagged until 1980 with few results.155
Galtieri’s decision to invade the Falklands derived from the belief that Britain was not
willing to risk war over a group of islands that had virtually no intrinsic value to anyone. He
concluded that Britain was not prepared to fight a war over eight thousand miles from home.
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Likewise, Galtieri anticipated that Argentina’s assistance in Central America, its newfound
international significance following the grain embargo, and the Reagan administration’s attempts
to reestablish strong bilateral relations were enough to force the U.S. to remain neutral during the
conflict. David Feldman argues that Galtieri’s decision was further “bolstered by the high praise
he had received from U.S. officials in Washington…and by the presence of numerous officials
who honored him during his stay.” Confident of success, Galtieri ordered the invasion on 2
April 1982.156
From the outset of the war, the Reagan administration tried frantically to stop any
conflict. The night of the invasion Reagan spent over an hour desperately trying to compel
Galtieri to call off the invasion. Only four days later, Reagan dispatched Haig on a diplomatic
odyssey moving between London, Washington, and Buenos Aires. When these attempts failed,
the Reagan administration announced on 30 April that it planned to withhold certification of
Argentine military sales, block EXIM Bank credits and guarantees, and deter loans from the
Commodity Credit Corporation. Ironically, starting from vastly differing ideologies and beliefs,
both the Carter and Reagan administrations ended with nearly identical foreign policies towards
Argentina.157
Only two months after the outbreak of war Galtieri announced Argentina’s surrender to
the British. Two days later, on 17 June, he resigned as president. The junta was officially
replaced by a provisional government that pledged to hold elections. Argentina’s dirty war was
over.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

In October 1983, Argentina returned to civilian control with the election of Radical Party
leader Raúl Alfonsín as president. To be sure, Alfonsín’s victory was a paramount shift in the
history of Argentina. Not only did it represent the first legitimate election in years, but it also
marked the first time the Peronists had ever been defeated in a presidential election, eliminating
the notion of invincibility that had remained so prevalent in the movement’s mystique for
generations.
In the United States, Alfonsín’s victory was easily obscured by the morass of entrenched
partisan politics and ideological differences that had become so customary in the preceding five
years. Incredibly, the Reagan administration attempted to take responsibility for Argentina’s
return to democracy, while critics in the human rights community and the left in Congress
promoted Alfonsín’s election as evidence that “positive political forces had always lurked just
below the surface, and that their late emergence was due to a…refusal by the White House to
recognize their existence all along.”158
U.S. foreign policy objectives towards Argentina changed dramatically between 1977 and
1982, as did conditions on the ground. Yet, despite what proponents and critics of both
administrations argue, neither approach had a great bearing on the eventual conclusion to the
Argentine situation, except in fortuitous ways.
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With Jimmy Carter’s inauguration and the subsequent announcement of American
military aid cuts in February 1977, the Argentine junta made a conscientious decision to
temporarily sacrifice strong bilateral relations with the U.S. if that was the price for continuing
its counterterrorism war and its attendant abuses. The Carter administration’s emphasis on
human rights resulted in outright hostility between the two countries. Every U.S. sanction
enforced under the Carter administration had little or no influence on the Argentina’s economy
or military vigilance and failed at its ultimate goal of staying the hand of the junta. Likewise, the
vast majority of human rights abuses committed during the dirty war occurred during Carter’s
tenure. In retrospect, Carter’s human rights policies and the Argentine military’s perception of
its own national security interests resulted in a fundamental clash in the basic orientation of
bilateral objectives.
However, these facts should not obscure Carter’s success in the human rights front.
Although difficult to gauge, the Carter administration’s continued pressure did succeed in
protecting and saving the lives of a number of individuals, most notably that of Jacobo
Timerman. Likewise, by separating himself from the Argentine military during the dirty war,
Carter succeeded in preserving the status and reputation of the United States in the eventuality of
a return to civilian rule. Therefore, while criticism of the degree to which Carter’s policies
extended may be legitimate, it is unreasonable to condemn the basis upon which his policies
were founded and the success such measures brought about.
Yet, Carter’s stringent emphasis on human rights also resulted in a number of unintended
consequences. By adhering to a strict foreign policy lacking flexibility and based largely on
human rights considerations, the Carter administration made it a virtual impossibility to
recognize or reward any advancement in Argentina. This was largely because a complete regime
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change represented the only criterion by which the standards the U. S. administration set could
be satisfied.
Likewise, Carter unintentionally and unknowingly provided the basis for undermining his
own grain embargo by continually punishing and ostracizing the junta. Economically, the grain
embargo of 1980 offered the junta requisites from the U.S. it could not accept and opportunities
with the Soviets it could not possibly reject. Thereafter, the Carter administration hastily
attempted to remedy the situation. In order not to appear contradictory, the administration noted
that much of the change towards Argentina was in response to the improved human rights
situation. Yet, the sudden change in foreign policy was clearly not a byproduct of the situation
on the ground but by the junta’s newfound international relevance with the grain embargo and
the apparent failure of three years of strict sanctions.
As confirmed by his successor’s policies, Carter’s lack of flexibility in foreign policy
probably did not make much of a difference either. Ronald Reagan quickly attempted to rebuild
bilateral relations by completely removing human rights considerations from the public arena
and recognizing improvements in that area in Argentina. Despite this, in most areas of genuine
importance, the junta often went its own way. Even their shared policy on Central America,
perhaps the greatest arena of understanding and cooperation between the two countries, was
more an agreement to curtail the spread of communism rather than the result of an outright
alliance.
Yet, competing political ideologies and partisan politics in the United States also
obscured important questions raised following the failure of the grain embargo. Was a change in
foreign policy worth attempting? How useful were sanctions beyond a definite point? Would an
attempt at reconciliation better serve U.S. policy objectives by providing America more leverage
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than continued ostracism? Unfortunately, the partisan landscape in Washington often disguised
any objective consideration of such policies, rendering the human rights situation in Argentina
secondary to the reputation and prominence of each political party.
If Carter had succeeded in his reelection campaign and followed the same policies he
employed from 1977 to 1980, it is unlikely that the regime would have collapsed any sooner or
responded any more favorably. Likewise, had the foreign policies adhered to during the Reagan
administration been in place since 1977, perhaps there would have been even greater numbers of
victims during the dirty war. From either vantage point, it is clear that American foreign policy
objectives were severely restricted by the junta’s perceived threat of communist expansion and
the limited leverage the U.S. garnered in bilateral relations. Yet, such conjecture should not
obscure the fact that it is most likely in either case that the status of Argentina’s economy would
have eventually elicited the same political turmoil that prompted Galtieri to attempt a
diversionary military adventure in the South Atlantic.
In retrospect, Argentina’s dirty war presented a virtual no-win situation for either
administration. Had Argentina been poorer, closer in proximity to the U.S., and more reliant on
American funding and support, perhaps both Carter’s and Reagan’s foreign policies would have
garnered more influence and leverage over the junta. Were all that true, it is easy to assume that
the sanctions the Carter administration applied may have prompted greater results. Perhaps the
sanctions might never have been employed in the first place. Likewise, the Reagan
administration might have succeeded in preventing a war between allies. As it was, however,
both administrations assumed that American leverage alone was enough to produce the desired
effects they intended. Yet, due to Argentina’s relative autonomy from the U.S., the distance
between the two countries, and openly competing economies, American foreign policy never
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acquired the influence required to produce such results. Under such circumstances, neither
administration succeeded in its foreign policy objectives towards Argentina. Try as they might,
Carter could not tear down the junta and Reagan could not resuscitate it.
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